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TAX TRANSIDONS, OPPORTUNISTIC
RETROACTIVITY, AND THE BENEFITS
OFGOVERNMENT PRECOMMITMENT

Kyle D. Logue*
"[T]he maximal exploitation of present possibilities may often be an
obstacle to the maximal creation of new possibilities."1
"Discretion is the enemy of optimality, commitment its ally."2

INTRODUCTION

if the current federal income tax laws were repealed and
replaced with a simple flat tax? What if the entire Internal Reve
nue Code ( with its graduated rates and countless deductions, exclu
What

sions, and credits) were scuttled in favor of a broad-based
consumption tax? Only a few years ago, such proposals would have
seemed radical and extremely unlikely to be adopted. But times
are changing. Calls for a drastic overhaul of the Internal Revenue
Code have become commonplace, even at the highest levels in the
tax-policy community.3 In addition, proposals that would replace
the income tax with a flat-rate broad-based consumption tax have
received substantial bipartisan support in Congress.4 And many
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1987, Auburn
University; J.D. 1990, Yale University. - Ed.
I received helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article from Steve Croley, Heidi
Feldman, Merritt Fox, Peter Hammer, Jon Hanson, Rick Hills, John Jackson, Avery Katz,
Mark Killenbeck, Jim Krier, Jeff Lehman, Rick Lempert, Bill Miller, Rick Pildes, Bob
Rasmussen, Stuart Thiel, and workshop participants at the University of Michigan, New York
University, and Vanderbilt Law Schools. I received generous research support from the Uni
versity of Michigan Law School Cook Research Fund. I also wish to thank Michael Graetz,
Louis Kaplow, Jeff Strnad, and other participants at the Harvard Law School Seminar on
Current Research in Taxation (Aug. 1994) for comments and suggestions on the initial draft
of this article.
1. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONAL
ITY 10 (1984) (paraphrasing J OSEPH SCHUMPETER, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS '07
(1954)).
2. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government Commit
ment, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY 245-46 (Pierre Bourdieu & James s.
Coleman eds., 1991).
3. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABusHKA, THE FLAT TAx 1 (2d ed. 1995) (quot
ing Shirley Peterson, former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service) ("I would re
peal the entire Internal Revenue Code and start over. ").
4. Representative Richard Armey, for example, has proposed a flat tax of 17% to be
applied only to wages and pension income with an exclusion for investment income. Because
of the exclusion for investment income, the Armey flat tax is a form of consumption tax. For
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commentators believe that Congress is likely to enact some version
of these proposals in the not-too-distant future.5
One of the most important issues raised by the prospect of radi
cal tax reform is that of transition effects.6 Each of the tax-reform
proposals currently under consideration would eliminate many of
the deductions, exclusions, and credits that individuals and busi
nesses have come to rely upon.7 Therefore, unless Congress accom
panies the repeal of those provisions with some form of transition
relief (such as grandfathered, phased-in, or delayed effective dates)
any taxpayer who made an investment in reliance on the prior rule

will suffer substantial transition losses, losses in the value of pretran
sition investments.
As the tax-reform movement gathers momentum, however, so
not to provide transition relief
to those taxpayers who will be harmed by the reforms. This pres
sure comes from several sources. First, Congress may feel the need
to keep tax reform at least revenue neutral, and transition relief
may be the most obvious way of saving money.8 Second, politicians
may see tax reform as an opportunity actually to raise revenue.
Given the political risk associated with being the congressperson
too will the pressure on lawmakers

the classic description of a consumption-based flat tax upon which the Anney plan is based,
see HALL & RUBusHKA, supra note 3. Another recent proposal for replacing the current
income tax with a broad-based consumption tax that has received a great deal of attention is
the plan put forward by Senators Sam Nunn and Pete Domenici, called the Unlimited Sav
ings Allowance (USA) Tax System. See H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995);
S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (dubbing the proposal the "USA Tax Act of 1995").
Under the USA tax system, taxpayers essentially would be allowed to deduct amounts set
aside for savings or investment; thus, the USA tax amounts to a cash-flow consumption tax as
well. For a general discussion of these and other recent flat-tax-refonn proposals, see JoINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, l04TH CoNG., 1ST SESS., DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RELATING TO FLAT
TAX RATE PROPOSALS (Comm. Print 1995).
5. See, e.g., Jerry Heaster, Reform, Via a Flat Tax, Seems Likely, KAN. CITY STAR, May 7,
1995, at G1 (quoting economists and political analysts who view radical tax refonn as highly
likely in coming years); Sheldon D. Pollack, Consumption Taxes, Flat Taxes, Capital Gains,
and Other Tax Fantasies, 66 TAX NOTES 577, 578 (1995) ("[T]here is surprisingly strong sup
port on both sides of the aisle in Congress for both of these very radical tax proposals [cut in
the capital gains tax and replacement of the federal income tax], and hence, they must be
considered as viable political options."); David E. Rosenbaum, Washington Memo: Debate of
Flat Tax Revives Simplicity vs. Fairness Issue, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 1995, at Al.
6. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 27-28.
7. For example, the Hall-Rabushka flat tax would eliminate all deductions other than the
deduction for the costs of inputs used in the production of goods and services, including the
costs of plant and equipment and employee wages and salaries; it also would eliminate all
credits and exclusions, other than the personal exemption. See HALL & RABusHKA, supra
note 3, at 110-11. Note, however, that the flat tax, despite its name, would retain a degree of
progressivity because of the personal exemption.
8. See, e.g., Alliance USA, Description and Explanation ofthe Unlimited Savings Allow
ance Income Tax System, 66 TAX NoTES 1481, 1487 (1995) ("The USA Tax System is
designed to replace on a revenue-neutral basis the present corporate and individual income
taxes . . . . )
"

.
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who votes for a tax-rate increase, lawmakers may find the prospect
of foregoing transition relief an attractive alternative source o� rev

enue. Finally, lawmakers may be concerned about the perceptions
of unfairness sometimes associated with the enactment of transition
rules designed to
taxpayers.

protect particular taxpayers or

groups

of

In addition to the political forces pushing against the provision
of transition relief in tax reform, the dominant view in the legal
academy also opposes government-provided protection for losses
arising from changes in the tax laws. Professor Michael Graetz, in a

1977 article,9 and Professor Louis Kaplow,

in a

1986 article,10

pres

ent an elegant and compelling argument that Congress should
adopt a policy of providing little or no transition relief to taxpayers
who suffer losses owing to unanticipated tax-law changes. Put dif
ferently, under the Graetz-Kaplow theory, tax-law changes (indeed,

all legal changes) should be made fully retroactive.11 That argu
ment has gone largely unchallenged in the legal academy.12 More

over, Professor Saul Levmore, taking the case for retroactive
taxation one step further, has argued that the occasional, unex
pected use of retroactive taxation may provide a potentially rich
and nondistortionary source of revenue for the government.13

This article challenges the conventional academic wisdom that

nominal retroactivity is presumptively efficient. In contrast to the
Graetz-Kaplow view, I argue that, for certain types of t� transi

tions, the efficient transition policy entails full transition relief in

the form of guaranteed grandfathering. The article is arranged as
follows: Part I describes the issue of tax transitions more generally
and details the Graetz-Kaplow efficiency argument for denying
compensation to taxpayers who suffer tax-transition losses. Part II

then defines a category of tax transitions for which the optimal

9. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revi
sion, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, f!J7 (1977) [hereinafter Graetz, Retroactivity].
10. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV. 509
(1986).
11. Graetz and Kaplow's positions with respect to tax transitions are discussed in more
detail infra in Parts I and III.
12. There have been two noteworthy articles rejecting the Graetz-Kaplow conclusion, at
least with respect to some types of tax transitions. See Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies:
One-Time v. Periodic An Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L. REV.
305 (1994); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection
Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 15 VA. L. REv. 1155 (1989). I discuss the
Goldberg article infra in section V.B.4 and the Ramseyer-Nakazato article infra in section
III.D.

13. See Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL Sruo. 265, 273-78
(1993). I discuss Levmore's arguments infra in section IV.B.2.
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transition policy probably is full transition relief in the form of
grandfathered effective dates.14
changes in

incentive subsidies,

That category is composed of

that is, tax provisions designed by

Congress to alter taxpayers' incentives or, more specifically, to in
duce taxpayers to increase their investment in some socially desira
ble activity. To make the case for guaranteed grandfathering, I
exploit the analogy between incentive subsidies and government
contracts. My argument is essentially this: We generally believe it
is a good idea for the government to keep its contractual promises,
those made to private parties and those made to other govern
ments. Indeed, I argue that in most situations involving implicit or
explicit government contracts our policy is that the government
must keep its word. Next, I argue that, for the same reasons we
follow such a policy in cases of government contracts, we should
follow such a policy with respect to incentive-subsidy provisions,
which are analogous to contracts in important ways. As I explain
below, such a transition policy requires the government to guaran
tee grandfather treatment whenever an incentive subsidy is re
pealed

or

substantially

reduced.

Failure

to

make

such

a

commitment can produce a number of problems, including an inef
ficient increase in the default premium that the government must
pay taxpayers to compensate them for the risk of tax transitions.
Failing to provide transition relief in such contexts, I argue,
amounts to opportunistic behavior on the part of the government.
Part III responds to a number of specific objections that might
be raised in response to my argument. Part IV then begins to draw
a distinction between incentive-subsidy transitions and other types
of tax transitions for which efficiency may require some degree of
retroactivity. This latter class of tax transitions includes legislative
corrections of obvious drafting errors and broad-based tax transi
tions such as an increase in tax rates or a shift from an income
based to a consumption-based tax. Therefore, Part IV agrees with
Levmore that some nominally retroactive tax changes can have effi
ciency benefits, but it suggests that those benefits are easily over
stated. Finally, Part V concludes with a discussion of some of the
practical

problems

associated

with

designing

an

efficient

grandfathering policy, and it provides a brief examination of some
ways in which the government could precommit to the transition
policy described in Part II.
14. Although I sometimes use the language of "efficiency," the normative criterion that I
apply, as do Graetz, Kaplow, and others, is a version of utilitarianism. See infra note 40.
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TAX TRANSITIONS: THE DEBATE

Defining Transition Losses and Transition Relief

Any time Congress changes the federal income tax laws and any
time the Treasury Department or a court alters its interpretation of
those laws, there typically will be a class of taxpayers who will suffer
transition losses. Likewise, tax-law changes also give rise to transi
tion gains; those taxpayers who are holding investments that hap
pen to benefit from a tax change suddenly experience a windfall
increase in the value of those investments. 1s
The classic illustration of these concepts involves the repeal of
the exemption for interest on state and local bonds. Suppose a tax
payer were to purchase a long-term bond that paid interest in an

nual installments with the principal returned at the date of
maturity. Assuming for simplicity that this investment is risk-free,
the price of the bond would be equal to the discounted present
value of the after-tax cash flow that the taxpayer expects to receive
on the bond. Assume that, at the time of purchase, the interest on
the bond is exempt from federal income taxation and therefore the
price of the bond would equal the discounted value of the pretax
cash flow. Now suppose that, in the following year, Congress re
peals the interest exemption and provides no transition relief to tax
payers who made investments in reliance on the old exemption.
The value of the taxpayer's formerly exempt bond would fall, and
the taxpayer would suffer a transition loss. Likewise, when the tax
exemption was first enacted, the lucky or clever taxpayers who hap

pened to have purchased their bonds prior to the passage of the
exemption would enjoy transition gains.
Transition losses can occur whether the new tax law or new in
terpretation applies nominally retroactively or nominally prospec
tively.16 Under a nominally retroactive tax-law change, the change
applies nof only to income that is earned after the date of enact
ment but also to income earned before the date of enactment. 17
Under a nominally prospective income tax change, however, the
new law applies only to income earned after the date of enactment
15. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 517; Michael J. Mcintyre, Transition Rules: Learning to
Live With Tax Reform, 4 TAX NoTES 7, 12 {1976).
16. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 57-60.
17. For examples of nominally retroactive tax transitions, see infra section IV.A (discuss
ing the Carlton case) and IV.B.2 (discussing retroactive income tax rate increases). Most
nominally retroactive tax changes apply only to the year in which the change is enacted.
Theoretically, a retroactive tax change also could apply to income earned in tax years prior to
the year of enactment. If the tax change applies to earlier years, however, it might indeed
run afoul of the Constitution. See infra note 130 (citing sources).
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and, often, only to income earned after the end of the year of enact
ment. Under either type of transition, if the change applies to in
come earned on pre-enactment investments and is not anticipated
by taxpayers, transition losses will occur.18 Returning to the tax
exempt-bond example, as long as the repeal of the tax exemption
applies to future income on bonds that were purchased before the
repeal was enacted, there will be transition losses.19
When enacting changes in the federal tax laws, Congress often
provides some type of transition relief. For example, Congress fre
quently uses nominally prospective effective dates for new tax laws.
In some circumstances, however, Congress instead uses

phased-in,

delayed, or grandfathered effective dates. Under a phased-in effec
tive date, the change is made effective gradually, and the transition
effects are mitigated (spread over time) but not eliminated. Under
a delayed effective date, the change is announced upon enactment
but made effective at some later date. This, too, provides only par
tial transition relief. Under a grandfathered effective date, how
ever, the new tax provision applies only to income earned on
investments that are made after the date on which the change is
enacted or after some later date.20 Thus, grandfathered effective
dates essentially provide full transition relief or full protection
against tax-transition losses. As discussed in section II.C below,
however, there are circumstances in which a grandfathered effective
date provides less-than-full relief or more-than-full relief, depend
ing on whether the grandfather treatment is made transferable.
Congress is not the only source of tax-transition losses. When
the Treasury Department issues new regulations or rulings or when
a court renders a decision interpreting the tax laws, similar losses
can occur. In the case of rulings and regulations, the Treasury
Department is authorized by statute to provide transition relief in
the form of nominally prospective effective dates.21 Absent Treas18. Professor Graetz was the first to draw the distinction between effective dates that are
nominally prospective and those that are nominally retroactive. More important, he was the
first to demonstrate that applying a transition nominally prospectively will not provide full
transition relief. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9. Note, however, that, with respect to
certain types of incentive-subsidy provisions, such as an "up-front" incentive subsidy, a nomi
nally prospective effective date will provide almost full transition protection against the risk
of a repeal. See infra section .Y.B.5 (discussing up-front incentive subsidies).
19. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 57-60.
20. See DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX

PouCY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR
BASIC TAX REFORM 166-68 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS]; Graetz, supra note 9, at
60.

21. Code § 7805(b) empowers the Treasury Department to decide whether to apply regu
lations retroactively: "The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or
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ury Department action, however, the new regulations and rulings
are automatically applied nominally retroactively.22
In contrast to the Treasury Department's practice, courts rarely
proyide transition relief. When a court issues a decision interpret
ing a tax provision for the first time, the court almost always applies
its new interpretation retroactively; that is, it applies the interpreta
tion to the taxpayer in the case before it and typically to all taxpay
ers who present similar situations, even

if their conduct took place

before the decision. This practice is consistent with courts' long
standing tradition of applying most judicial decisions
retroactively.23
Transition losses and gains, of course, are not limited to changes
in tax laws. They can be observed in connection with any type of
legal transition: for example, an increase in airline-safety standards
or a decrease in federal defense spending.24 Although this article
focuses on the issue of tax transition losses, much of the analysis
applies to other legal transitions as well.
B.

Should the Government Compensate Transition Losses?

The critical normative question raised by tax transitions is
whether the government should provide transition relief.25 For
regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect."
I.R.C.§ 7805(b) (1996).
22. The Treasury Department's discretion under§ 7805(b) has limits. For example, if a
regulation has existed unchanged for many years, it may acquire the force of law, in which
case retroactive repeal can come only from Congress. See Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939). See generally Borus I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LoKKEN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsrATE, AND GIFIS 'l[ 110.4.3 (1992).
23. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years."). See gener
ally Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993) (surveying the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on retroactive application of constitutional decisions). The primary
exception to the rule of retroactive application of judicial decisions comes in the civil context,
where a "newprinciple of law" can be applied prospectively, if prospective application would
avoid "injustice and hardship" without unduly undermining the "purpose and effect" of the
new rule. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
24. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 515-19.
25. A similar question often has been addressed in connection with nontax legal transi
tions. For example, much of the literature on the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution
includes analyses of the question whether the government should provide compensation to
citizens whose property it takes for a public purpose. E.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL L. REv. 569 (1984);
Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation be Paid? 99 Q.J.
EcoN. 71 (1984); Louis De Alessi, Implications of Property Rights for Government Invest
ment Choices, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 13 (1969); Wiiiiam A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings,

Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988); Kaplow, supra note 10; Frank Michelman, Property,
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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many years, the dominant view was that tax changes should not be
applied retroactively.26 This view apparently derived from the be
lief that retroactive application would upset taxpayers' "reasonable
expectations" regarding the tax treatment of investments they had
made "in reliance" on the prior law.27 This view of tax transitions is
sometimes referred to as "old view."28 As stated, however, such a
reliance-based defense of transition relief begs the relevant ques
tion: Do taxpayers in such situations have a normative claim to a
government-provided guaranty of the tax treatment of pretransition
investments?
Two of the most comprehensive attempts to answer this ques
tion came in the scholarship of Professors Graetz and Kaplow.29
Although their analyses are distinguishable in important ways,3o
their arguments can be usefully combined and summarized as

follows:

(1) In the U.S. economy, investors constantly face risks of one
kind or another (for example, the risk of unanticipated inflation or
a shift in consumer preferences) which can be called "market risks. "
Moreover, with a few exceptions, the government typically does not
provide insurance for such risks. To the contrary, efficient market
incentives are best maintained

if

investors bear the full costs of

their investments.

26. See Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1575, 1650 (1979) [hereinafter Graetz, Consumption Tax] ("The politically dominant
approach to significant changes in the tax law has been to protect the expectations of taxpay
ers who have 'relied' on existing law; protection typically takes the fom1 of 'grandfathered'
effective dates.") (citing, among other sources, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 181-215; and
INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION 18792, 198-200 (1978)).
27. E.g., Committee on Tax Policy, New York State Bar Association, Retroactivity of Tax
Legislation, 29 TAX LAw. 21 (1975); Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule
of Prospectivity, 84 HARv. L. REv. 436 (1970).
28.

See Levmore, supra note 13, at 267-68.

29. Other particularly cogent and influential analyses of tax transitions include
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 159-87; and Mcintyre, supra note 15.
30. Kaplow concludes that, under certain assumptions, all forms of tax-transition relief
are generally undesirable. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 615. Graetz, however, would per
mit the occasional use of phased-in or delayed effective dates, depending upon the magnitude
of the wealth loss the transition causes. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 87. An
other distinctive part of Kaplow's treatment of legal transitions is its comprehensiveness.
Not only does he address transition losses that result from any type of legal transition (not
just tax transitions), but he also addresses the symmetrical issue of transition gains (or "wind
fall gains") that result when taxpayers see the value of the pretransition investment rise as a
result of the legal transition. Kaplow correctly notes that all the same issues apply to windfall
gains. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 553-55.
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The risk that the government may change the tax laws in a

manner that reduces the value of taxpayers' pretransition invest
ments is not significantly different from market risk.

(3) Therefore, the efficiency criterion generally supports a tran
sition policy under which the government does not compensate
transition losses but instead leaves private investors to bear the risk
of tax-law changes.31
Kaplow generalizes this government-risk argument to all forms
of legal transitions:
Generally, transitional relief is inefficient because it insulates inves
tors from the real effects of their decisions, and thus distorts their
behavior. . . . Given the close kinship between uncertainty regarding
government policy and market uncertainty, the belief that market re
sponses are typically more efficient than government relief in address
ing market risk suggests that transitional relief in mitigation of
uncertain government policy is likewise undesirable.32

He also stated that "[the] simultaneous consideration of risk and
incentives leads to the conclusion that government transitional re
lief generally is undesirable....[G]overnment compensation or

other transitional relief usually is inefficient." 33 Graetz makes the
government-risk argument in the federal income tax context:
Recent tax legislation has tended to institutionalize expectations of
grandfathered effective dates in the tax context. This should be re
versed. The tax law must remain a flexible instrument of public pol
icy. When a provision has outlived its usefulness, it should be
eliminated without the delay and windfall gains inherent in
grandfathering prior transactions. People should make investments
with the expectation that political policies may change.34

The Graetz-Kaplow analysis therefore concludes that it would

be inefficient for Congress to bind itself to apply a given tax rule to

a given pretransition investment. Put differently, they conclude

that it would be inefficient for Congress to commit to a policy of
providing tax-transition relief in the form of grandfathered effective
dates.35 Graetz ultimately concludes that, when transition losses are
31. See generally Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 65-66, frl; Kaplow, supra note 10,
at 513-14, 520, 527-36.
32. Kaplow, supra note 10, at 513-14.
33. Id. at 615-16.
34. Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at frl. In fairness, Graetz and Kaplow both ac
knowledge a number of possible exceptions to their general arguments against transition
relief. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 87; Kaplow, supra note 10, at 616 & n.336.
35. It is also worth noting that other scholars have come to view the Graetz-Kaplow anal
ysis as standing for the rejection of grandfathered effective dates in tax transitions. See, e.g.,
Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 12, at 1155 ("[Graetz and Kaplow] argue that Congress
should abandon [the use of grandfather clauses] as economically inefficient and ethically
superfluous.").
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expected to be extremely large, transition relief in the form of
phased-in or delayed effective dates may be appropriate on effi
ciency and fairness grounds, but grandfathered effective dates
should not be used.36 Kaplow concludes generally that tax transi
tions should be fully, nominally retroactive.37 The Graetz-Kaplow
view of tax transitions, sometimes referred to as the "new view,"38
has largely supplanted the old reliance-based view as the dominant
scholarly paradigm.39
II.

A.

INCENTIVE SUBSIDIES AND THE CASE FOR GUARANTEED
GRANDFATHERING

The Default-Premium Effect and the Benefits of Government
Precommitment

This section discusses a category of tax transitions that, on effi
ciency grounds, should be accompanied by full transition relief in
the form of grandfathered effective dates.40 Included in this cate
gory are repeals of or significant reductions in incentive subsidies,
which I define as follows: provisions whose primary purpose is to

alter taxpayers' decisions regarding how they will invest their
resources. A simple example of such a provision is an incentive tax
credit, of which there are many in the Internal Revenue Code.41
Congress frequently uses such credits to increase taxpayer invest
ment in various types of targeted assets or activities, and such cred
its usually take the following form: If the taxpayer will increase her
investment in the targeted asset or activity, some percentage of that
increased investment will be allowed as a credit against the tax36. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 87; Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note
26, at 1650 ("[N]either fairness nor efficiency demands grandfathered effective dates, but ...
when the magnitude of change is large, its impact should be reduced through delayed or
phased-in effective dates rather than grandfathering."); id. at 1653 ("[G]randfathered effec
tive dates should not be enacted to protect assets that have received favored treatment under
the income tax.").
37. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 551-52.
38. See Levmore, supra note 13, at 268.
39. See id.; Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 12, at 1155-56. It is worth noting that,
following Graetz's 1977 article, the Tax Section of the ABA issued a report adopting some of
Graetz's recommendations. Special Comm. on Simplification, ABA Section of Taxation,
Evaluation of the Proposed Model Comprehensive Income Tax, 32 TAX LAW. 563, 680-86
(1979).
40. The normative criterion applied through most of the article is a loose version of the
Kaldor-Hicks variety, in other words, maximizing the size of the pie. Thus, typically when I
say "efficient" or "optimal," I mean Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or optimality. At points in the
article, however, I also address distributional concerns and how they may conflict with effi
ciency concerns.
41. See infra notes 70-78.
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payer's federal income tax liability. As a result, an investment that
would not have been profitable to the taxpayer absent the credit
(that is, it would not have produced a positive net present value)
becomes profitable once the credit is included.

An incentive tax credit can be designed in two general ways.
First, it can be designed as an up-front credit, which means that the
full amount of the credit applies to the taxpayer's tax liability in the
year in which the investment giving rise to the credit is made.42 Sec
ond, it can be designed as installment credit, which means that the
credit generated by an investment made in one year is spread over a
number of tax years.43 Note that the selection of the up-front or
installment design will in turn affect the design of the appropriate
transition relief. If an installment credit were repealed, for exam
ple, full transition relief would require a grandfather clause that ex
empts any investments made before the repeal was enacted or
before some date prior to the repeal. If, however, an up-front
credit is repealed, full transition relief simply means applying the
repeal nominally prospectively, as the taxpayers who relied upon
the credit already would have received the full tax benefit upon
which they relied. In other words, an up-front credit has a built-in
grandfather clause, assuming any repeal is nominally prospective.44

If Congress were to repeal an incentive tax credit without pro
viding transition relief (either in the form of a grandfathered effec
tive date for an installment credit or in the form of a nominally
prospective effective date for an up-front credit) taxpayers who in
vested in reliance on the credit would suffer a transition loss. That
possibility gives rise to the main point of this section: Because tax
payers who relied on the repealed incentive credit were "burned"
by the government, future incentive credits would have to be more
generous (for example, the credit percentage would have to be
greater) to achieve the same amount of increased investment in the
targeted asset or activity. This increase in the cost of the incentive
credit can be understood as a

default premium,

the premium tax

payers demand to compensate them for the possibility that the gov
ernment will repeal the incentive subsidy (in this example, the
incentive credit) without providing transition relief.
42. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 587 (coining the term "up front" subsidy).
43. Goldberg explores the distinction between up-front subsidies and installment subsi
dies in considerable detail. Although he uses different terminology ("one-time" subsidy and
"periodic" subsidy, respectively) the concepts are the same as those discussed by Kaplow and
by me. Goldberg, supra note 12.
44. See id. at 314; Kaplow, supra note 10, at 587.

1140

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:1129

The size of the default premium will be a function of the taxpay
ers' subjective estimate of the probability that the government will
repeal the credit without providing relief. To be specific, assuming
risk-neutral taxpayers, the value of the default premium will be
equal to 111-Pt. where Pt is the taxpayers' estimate of P, the
probability of uncompensated repeal. The size of the premium
would be greater if taxpayers were risk-averse with respect to the
possibility of uncompensated repeal. Note that this default
premium observation would apply not only to the repeal of an in
centive tax credit but also to the substantial reduction of such a
credit. More significantly, the default-premium observation applies
not only to incentive tax credits but also to the repeal of or reduc
tion in any incentive subsidy.
I refer to this cost of the government's failure to provide transi
tion relief has the default-premium effect. To reduce this cost, the
government must make a credible public precommitment to provide
transition relief. In Part V below, I discuss several possible precom
mitment devices that might be used in connection with incentive
subsidies.45 Of course, although government precommitment to
transition relief in this context may reduce the default-premium ef
fect, such precommitment too comes at a cost. More specifically, it
limits the government's ability to repeal incentive-subsidy provi
sions without having to provide transition relief.46 That cost of gov
ernment precommitment (measured in terms of lost policymaking
flexibility) could theoretically overwhelm the default-premium ef
fect, in which case, guaranteed grandfathering would be inefficient.
There are reasons to believe, however, that the reverse is more
likely to be true (that is, the default-premium effect is likely to
dominate in this setting): Because the government actually has
control over the probability of uncompensated repeal (in the ab
sence of a binding commitment to provide transition relief) taxpay
ers in such a situation would have a tendency to assign a large value
to Pt. Thus, even if taxpayers were risk-neutral, they would have a
tendency to demand a higher default premium than othenvise, that
is, higher than if the government had no control over P. If taxpay45. Interestingly, Professor Kaplow concludes generally that the government should not
commit to any substantive tax rule. He also concludes, however, that the government should
commit itself to maintain an optimal transition policy, which he distinguishes from substan
tive tax rules. Therefore, Kaplow recognizes that there are efficiency benefits to the govern
ment's precommitment to transition policy; however, he concludes that the efficient
transition policy is for the government not to provide transition relief. See Kaplow, supra
note 10, at 557-60.
46. See infra section IIl.B (discussing the distinction between opportunistic and nonop
portunistic legal transitions).
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ers were risk-averse, the size of the default premium would be even
greater. This tendency for taxpayers to assign a relatively high
value to the likelihood of uncompensated repeal strengthens the
case for guaranteed grandfathering of incentive-subsidy
provisions.47
Professor Graetz asserts that, if taxpayers' estiniate of Pis equal
to or less than the government's assessment of P (in other words Pt
<

or= PJ, the payment of the default premium (as opposed to

guaranteed transition relief) would unambiguously be the efficient
result.48 That conclusion, however, either ignores the possibility
that the government's precommitment costs could still be less than
Pt or assumes that the government's precommitment costs are
greater than Pt. Either way, the conclusion needs further justifica
tion. In addition, Graetz completely ignores the fact that the gov
ernment's control over P will cause taxpayers to increase their
subjective estimate of P.
In addition to the default-premium effect, if the government
were to make a practice of actively inducing taxpayers to rely on
47. Graetz acknowledges the potential efficiency benefits of reducing the default pre
mium (which he calls an "uncertainty premium") that would flow from the government's
precommitment to the transition policy I have described. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra
note 9, at 69-70. He concludes, however, that a commitment by the government to provide
grandfather treatment would be inefficient; further, he concludes that transition relief should
be supplied only on an ad hoc basis, depending upon the magnitude of the transition loss in
question. See id. at fr/. Kaplow, on the other hand, argues that it is always cheaper for the
government to pay the default premium than to commit to grandfathering an incentive
subsidy repeal. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 528-29. This argument seems clearly wrong,
for the reasons discussed in the text.
Goldberg acknowledges the default-premium effect, and, like me, he regards it as a rea
son for providing transition relief in this context. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 327. He
does not explain why it would be efficient to have the government rather than the individual
taxpayers bear the default premium. Indeed, Golberg's argument seems to be based primar
ily on an unspecified conception of fairness or horizontal equity. See id. at 323 ("If the sub
sidy is removed, however, transition rules should be enacted to prevent inequities . . . ."). In
addition, Goldberg does not address the issue of government precommitment, and thus he
does not suggest proposals for facilitating government precommitmeni to an optimal transi
tion policy. Finally, Goldberg ignores the boundary between incentive subsidies and other
types of tax provisions and the desirability of transition relief with respect to transitions in
the latter type of provision.
Graetz also provides a Rawlsian analysis of what would constitute a "fair" transition pol
icy from the perspective of the "original position;" he concludes that, "[i]n the context of a
progressive income tax, the repeal of tax-favored treatment for particular investments would
be the least likely category of change for which the parties would agree to require grandfa
ther clauses." Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 85 (quoting JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 199 (1971)). His argument is that the parties most likely to benefit from a rule
requiring grandfathering of such provisions are likely to be the "most-advantaged persons" in
society rather than the least. See id. at 86. But this conclusion does not follow. Which class
of individuals will benefit most from such a transition policy depends upon how the govern
ment spends the money it saves in reduced default premiums resulting from the policy. That
money could be distributed to the least-advantaged individuals in society, for example.
48.

See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 70.
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incentive subsidies only to repeal those provisions retroactively,
there would be additional costs. Tricking taxpayers in that way,
even if such an approach were efficient in a narrow sense, in a
broader sense, might be inefficient; for example, it might engender
distrust and antipathy toward the government.49 That reaction in
turn could undermine individuals' willingness to comply with the
tax laws, an ominous prospect in the federal income tax context, as
the system's success depends heavily upon a large degree of volun
tary compliance or self-assessment on the part of taxpayers.so
Given the costs associated with the uncompensated repeal of or
reduction in an incentive subsidy, an argument can be made that
the government should attempt to precommit to a policy of provid
ing guaranteed grandfather treatment for all incentive-subsidy pro
visions.

That is, the government should institute devices or

procedures designed to hinder violation of this optimal transition
policy. Below I discuss the considerations that go into designing the
appropriate grandfather rule and the appropriate precommitment
device.51 But first, let us consider an important preliminary ques
tion: Why bother with government precommitment? Why not sim
ply count on the government to make the correct tradeoff in each
case between the benefits and costs of transition relief? Truth be
told, lawmakers already may make this tradeoff optimally, at least
some of the time. That possibility is discussed further in Part V.
There may be reasons, however, to doubt the ability of
lawmakers to maintain an optimal transition policy over time
purely on an ad hoc basis, without any precommitment devices. It
may be that lawmakers (like the rest of us) cannot always be trusted
to make policy decisions that are efficient from a long-run perspec
tive. For example, they may have a tendency to overvalue policy
options that produce short-term benefits and delayed or untrace
able costs.52 Indeed, just such a governmental tendency has been
49. See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1214-18 {discussing the concept of "demoralization
costs"). For Graetz's response to Michelman's demoralization cost story, see Graetz, Retro
activity, supra note 9, at 72 n.77.
50. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 92
{2d ed. 1988). There is evidence suggesting that taxpayers are less willing to comply with the
tax laws if they perceive the system to be unfair or inconsistent. See Steven M. Sheffrin &
Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer
Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 193 (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1992). Goldberg makes a similar point. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 329.
51. See infra Part V.
52. There is some psychological evidence to support the notion that humans and other
animals have a tendency to make decisions that maximize their short-run utility at the ex
pense of their total utility. See George Ainslie, Beyond microeconomics: Conflict among
interests in a multiple self as a determinant of value, in THE MULTIPLE SELF. STUDIES IN
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characterized as a type of myopia.53 As Jon Bister and others have
observed, such myopia (in governments as in people) can be over
come best through some form of precommitment device.54
Therefore, to reduce the default-premium effect (that is, to min
imize P1), it might be necessary for the government to precommit to

provide full compensation in the event of.a change in an incentive
subsidy provision. Whether such a policy would be efficient, again,
depends upon the tradeoff between the benefits of reduced default
premiums and costs of reduced government flexibility. Making a
definitive computation of that tradeoff would be an enormous em
pirical undertaking, which is well beyond the scope of this article.

An alternative approach, however, would be to examine how this
cost-benefit tradeoff has been made in other, similar contexts. In
the following section, I consider the context of government con
tracts, where an almost identical cost-benefit analysis arises and
where we have decided, quite uncontroversially, to precommit to a
policy of full transition relief.

B.

The Analogy to Government Contracts

In this section, I develop the analogy between government con

tracts and incentive subsidies, and I argue that, in both contexts,

there are enormous efficiency benefits to the government's keeping
its word. To illustrate this point, let's begin with a generic example.
Assume that the government determines that some sort of intervenRATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 133 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); Frank A. Logan, Decision
making by Rats: Delay Versus Amount of Reward, 59 J. OF COMP. & PHYSIOLOGICAL
PsYCHOL. 1 (1965). This tendency can be understood as a weakness of will or as the applica

tion of an inappropriate discount rate.

53. See generally EI.STER, supra note 1, at 87-103.
54. The benefit of government precommitment is a common theme in constitutional the
ory. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 9-7, at 470, 473 (2d ed.
1988) (arguing that the Contract Clause can be understood as a means of precommitting the
government); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox ofDemocracy, in CONSTITU
TIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (reviewing the intel
lectual history of the government-precommitment problem in political theory). In recent
years, the benefits of government precommitment and the harms of failing to honor such
commitments have been formalized by both political theorists and macroeconomic theorists.
These models attempt to quantify the theoretical efficiency gains associated with the govern
ment's ability to make binding commitments. The classic article in this area, which gave rise
to the literature on the "time-consistency" problem, is Finn E. Kydland & Edward C.
Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. P oL. EcoN.
473 (1977). The default-premium problem discussed in the text is a version of this time
consistency problem. In developing the time-consistency model, macroeconomists have bor
rowed from two literatures (game theory and rational-choice theory) that for years have been
analyzing implicitly or explicitly the benefits of precommitment by individual and institu
tional actors. See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 1, at 65-76; THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY
OF CoNFUcr (1960); Robert H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Max
imization, 23 REV. EcoN. Sruo. 165 (1955).
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tion in the market is necessary to alter taxpayers' investment deci
sions; suppose, say, that the amount of low-income housing

produced by the unregulated private market is found, for whatever
reason, to be inadequate. To remedy this situation, the government
has several policy options. First, ignoring constitutional constraints
for the moment, the government could simply order private parties
to build and run the units at their own expense. We can call this
option uncompensated government coercion.ss Second, the govern
ment could use coercion but then compensate the parties for their
costs, an option that we can call compensated government coer
cion. S6 Third, the government could build and run the additional
housing units itself. That option we refer to as in-house government

contracting. Fourth, the government could contract directly with
private parties to build and run the units on behalf of the govern
ment, which we shall refer to as outside government contracting. Fi
nally, the government could enact a law that promised a payment
(for example, in the form of a tax credit) to any taxpayer who in
vested in low-income housing and who met certain other criteria.
The last policy option, of course, is the incentive subsidy.
Each of these policy options has costs and benefits. And the

choice of the most efficient (in other words, the most cost-effective)
means of increasing the level of investment in low-income housing

will depend upon the circumstances.s7 Consider each policy option
in turn. Although it may be difficult to identify the specific circum
stances in which uncompensated government coercion would be the
optimal tool for increasing the amount of low-income housing, that
option is at least conceptually available. The same goes for com
pensated government coercion.ss On the other hand, government
contracting (both in-house and outside) is often considered an effi
cient means of achieving policy goals of this sort. The choice be55. This is sometimes called "regulation."
56. This is sometimes called "eminent domain."
57. Cost-benefit analyses of these policy options are common. See, e.g., Richard Layard
& Stephen Glaister, Introduction to CoST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 1, 3 (Richard Layard et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1994) ("Three main methods of [government) intervention are
regulation, taxes
and subsidies, and public direction of what is to be produced, be it via public enterprise or
purchase from private firms. Each of these types of government activity can be subject to
cost-benefit analysis. . . ."). Some commentators argue, however, that the choice among such
policy options cannot be captured fully in a traditional cost-benefit analysis but instead re
quire sensitivity to the "cultural" consequences or the "expressive effect" associated with
each different policy option. E.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences
of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 940-41 (1991).
58. Compensated government coercion might be efficient, for example, during times of
military or medical emergency, when there isn't time for options three, four, or five to be
implemented effectively.
.

.

•
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tween the two requires the government to address the same sorts of
issues that private firms face when they decide whether to perform
some function "in house" or whether instead to "contract out."59
Finally, the incentive subsidy also has its place. If we have de
termined that the total quantity of some asset or activity is being
underproduced by the market, it is not difficult to imagine circum
stances in which an incentive subsidy would be the most efficient
means of �creasing the amount of the targeted investment. The
principal purported advantage of using an incentive subsidy is
that it requires relatively little involvement · or supervision by
government bureaucrats, and it promotes private, decentralized de
cisionmaking rather than government-based, centralized decision
making.60 Similarly, the incentive subsidy might be superior to
outside government contracting when contracting costs are high.
Returning to our example, suppose that, after reviewing these
options, the government determines that the most efficient way to
achieve its low-income-housing goal is to enter into a written con
tract with a group of private developers and pay them to build the
units. Thus, the parties draw up a contract that provides that the
developers will build the units, and, in return, the government will
pay the developers the agreed amount upon completion of the pro
ject. In the absence of contract law to bind the government to keep
its word, we can imagine that, after the developers have completed
their part of the bargain and built the housing units, the govern
ment might decide not to keep its end of the bargain.
Why would the government do such a thing? Because of
money. If the government were to renege on the deal, it would get
to take the money that had been earmarked for the developers and
59. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937).
60. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Pol
icy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705, 715-19
(1970). Surrey argues that, when it becomes desirable for the government to provide incen
tive subsidies (which he concedes happens), such subsidies should be provided through direct
government expenditures rather than through the federal income tax laws in the form of so
called tax expenditures. Surrey's arguments against the use of the income tax law to alter
behavior include the following: (a) tax incentives (at least those that take the form of deduc
tions or credits) disproportionately benefit taxpayers with relatively high incomes and (b) by
having the expenditures funneled through the tax-writing process rather than the normal
expenditure process, we run the risk of implementing conflicting policies and of unnecessarily
complicating the tax code. On the other side of that debate, however, some have argued that
tax subsidies may be superior to direct subsidies because the former requires less bureau
cracy than the latter. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Reha
bilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEXAS L. REv. 973, 1010-12 (1986).
That particular debate is beyond the scope of this article, and, for now, I remain agnostic
on the question whether incentive subsidies are provided best through tax expenditures or
direct expenditures. The framework of this article applies in either case to any type of incen
tive subsidy, whether it be a tax expenditure or direct subsidy.
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use that money for some other governmental objective. For exam
ple, the money could be spent on education or defense or deficit
reduction; or it could be redistributed to individual taxpayers in a
way that maximizes total social welfare, for example, it could be
redistributed from rich real-estate developers to homeless families.
Thus, there is a sense in which, once the private developers have
made the sunk investments necessary to build the low-income
housing units, the socially optimal policy decision might be for the
government to break its promise. If the government were to break
its commitment in that way, simply because it decided not to follow
through with the deal and instead to spend the money on something
else, it might be characterized as government opportunism.
If we allowed the government to break its contractual promises
without having to pay compensation, such a policy would come at a
high cost in terms of increased default premiums in future govern
ment contracts and increased disenchantment with the government
generally.61 As with incentive subsidies, whether those costs would
outweigh the benefits from the additional :flexibility that is gained
by permitting the government to disregard its contractual obliga
tions is an empirical question that I do not pretend to answer with
any certainty. Nevertheless, consider the following observation: as
a general rule, we in fact have adopted a transition policy that re
quires the government in most circumstances either to keep its con
tractual promises or pay contract damages. That is, we typically do
not allow our government (federal or state) to break its contractual
agreements without paying contract damages to the nonbreaching
party. If an agency of the U.S. government enters into a contract, it
is subject to general principles of contract law.62 Likewise, a state
61. According to standard contract theory, the prevention of opportunistic behavior is
one of the principal functions of contracts and contract law. See RICHARD A. POSNER, Eco
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 81 (3d ed. 1986) ("Thus the fundamental function of contract law
(and recognized as such at least since Hobbes's day) is to deter people from behaving oppor
tunistically toward their contracting parties, in order to encourage the optimal timing of eco
nomic activity and make costly self-protective measures unnecessary." (footnote omitted));
see also John H. Barton, The Economic Basis ofDamages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEOAL
STUD. 277 (1972) (demonstrating how a legally enforceable contract permits parties to over
come the prisoner's dilemma and to achieve joint-wealth-increasing cooperation). Professor
Oliver Williamson has written extensively about how markets can respond to overcome the
possibility of opportuniStic behavior. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERAR·
CHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 13 AM. EcoN. REv. 519 (1983).
62. See, e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,
52 (1986) ("[T]he Federal Government, as sovereign, has the power to enter contracts that
confer vested rights, and the concomitant duty to honor those rights . . . •" (citations omit
ted)); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 351 (1935) ("To say that the Congress may with
draw or ignore [its] pledge, is to assume that the Constitution contemplates a vain promise, a
pledge having no other sanction than the pleasure and convenience of the pledgor. This
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legislature will be bound by its contracts, either because of the Con
tracts Clause in the Constitution,6 3because of a comparable clause
in the relevant state constitution, or because of an explicit waiver of
sovereign immunity. Presumably the principal reason we have
adopted this policy of holding the government to its contractual

commitments is that we have determined implicitly that the costs of
the alternative policy outweigh the benefits of such a policy. What's
more, that policy is uncontroversial.64

If the preceding paragraph presents a satisfactory description of
what justifies our decision to apply contract law to the government,
Court has given no sanction to such a conception of the obligations of our Government.");
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934) ("Congress was free to reduce gratuities
deemed excessive. But Congress was without power to reduce expenditures by abrogating
contractual obligations of the United States. To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen
government expenditure, would be not the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation.").
Note, however, that Congress imposes a clear-statement restriction on its ability to bind itself
into the future. See Bowen, 477 U.S. at 52 ("[W]e have declined in the context of commercial
contracts to find that a 'sovereign forever waives the right to exercise one of its sovereign
powers unless it expressly reserves the right to exercise that power in' the contract." (quoting
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982))). This is sometimes called the
"unmistakability doctrine."
The remedy against the federal government for breach of contract has developed in
stages. Prior to 1855, a citizen with a monetary claim against the United States could seek
redress only through a private bill introduced in Congress. See Jeremy Travis, Note, Rethink
ing Sovereign Immunity after Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 642 (1982). In 1855, Congress
created the Court of Claims and empowered it to hear claims against the United States
founded upon any act of Congress or regulation of an executive department or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359,§§ 1, 2,
5, 24 Stat. 505, 506. Through the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1994), Congress re
sponded to the inadequacies of the original Court of Claims legislation. The Act added to
that court's jurisdiction claims founded upon the Constitution and claims for liquidated or
unliquidated damages not sounding in tort. In addition, district courts were given concurrent
jurisdiction of any claims under the statute not exceeding $10,000. See 14 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 3657 (1976). Federal law deter
mines liability under the statute. See Roxfort Holding Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 587,
589 (D.N.J. 1959) ("[T]he matter of liability of the federal government is to be determined by
federal law.").
63. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of states' immunity from suit early in the
development of American jurisprudence, deciding that the Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. art.
I,§ 10, cl. 1, could defeat a state's claim of sovereign immunity. See Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
For a variety of reasons, the Contracts Clause fell into disuse until 1977. See United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). See generally, TRIBE, supra note 54, at 613-28
(summarizing the history of Contracts-Clause jurisprudence).

64. Put in these terms, the notion of eliminating the government's discretion to break its
contracts seems to be in tension with the general conclusion suggested by the Graetz-Kaplow
analysis, the conclusion that losses caused by legal transitions, in most cases, should not be
compensated by the government. As discussed more fully in the following section, however,
in the case of the government's opportunistic breach of its own contracts, we have identified
a type of government risk with respect to which the government is unambiguously the least
cost insurer and a type of transition loss that on efficiency grounds should be compensated.
But see Kaplow, supra note 10, at n.54 (acknowledging that the government should pay for
goods and services it uses but failing to generalize the point to all government contracts or to
other legal transitions).
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consider what · inferences might be drawn about how we should
treat incentive-subsidy provisions. Specifically, consider the follow
ing argument: To the extent (a) we are persuaded that incentive
subsidies are like government contracts in important ways,6s and
(b) we are persuaded that, in deciding to make the government gen
erally subject to contract-law principles, we have made the right
tradeoff between default-premium concerns and government
fiexibility concerns, the same general rule that we have adopted
with respect to government contractual commitments should also
be applied to all incentive-subsidy provisions. Under this view,
when an incentive subsidy is repealed or substantially reduced, the
optimal transition policy would be to provide full transition relief in
the form of grandfathered effective dates.66
This argument can be generalized. If we can identify any laws
or government policies that are analogous to government contracts,
the same sort of efficiency argument in favor of a binding precom
mitment to provide transition relief and against government oppor
tunism can be made. For example, the possibility of opportunistic
government behavior is a significant problem in the context of
agreements between sovereign nations. The following hypothetical
example illustrates the classic problem of one government acting
opportunistically toward another:
The government of a developing nation is negotiating with a multina
tional corporation over an investment project. Eager to have the for
eign firm undertake the project, it is prepared to offer handsome
incentives over the life cycle of the investment. The firm remains re
luctant. It realizes that once its investment is made and the capital is
sunk, its bargaining strength diminishes rapidly. The host government
would then be in a position - and have the incentive - to impose
new requirements (costs) on the firm, which might more than offset
the original incentives. Under the circumstances, the multinational
will undertake the investment only if it receives substantially larger
benefits at the outset. Even then, it will be hesitant to increase the
scale of the enterprise, even if it is successful, without further induce
ments. The host government is perplexed: It would like to promise

65. Note that an incentive subsidy has some of the characteristics of an old common law
unilateral contract. See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 2 Q.B. 484 (1892).
66. Several previous analyses of tax transitions have recommended a similar transition
policy with respect to incentive-subsidy transitions; however, none of them justifies this posi·
tion by using the sort of efficiency argument that I offer. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at
176-77; Mcintyre, supra note 15, at 13. In addition, as explained below, there are some im
portant differences between the incentive-subsidy transition policy that those authors ad
vance and the one that I advance.
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that no onerous requirements will be imposed in the future but has no
way to commit itself or its successor credibly.67

Thus, the government would benefit from being able to commit it
self credibly not to act opportunistically.
Another area of potential government opportunism that does
not involve government contracts is public-utility regulation. When
a state regulates an electric utility, for example, there is an implicit
or explicit understanding that investors in the utility will receive a

reasonable rate of return, and this rate of return is included in the
costs that the utility is allowed to recover in setting its rates. Once

investors have sunk a certain amount into the enterprise, however,

the state regulatory authority has an incentive to reduce the rates
that the utility can charge. This example is another extreme form of
government opportunism.68
To summarize, in all of these settings, the default-premium con
cerns discussed in section II.A are present. In addition, the analogy

to government contracts discussed in this section would suggest
that, absent some powerful argument to the contrary, the optimal

transition rule in those settings would be for the government to

precommit to provide full transition relief in the event of a change

in policy.69

67. Dani Rodrik & Richard Zeckhauser, The Dilemma of Government Responsiveness, 7

J. POLY. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601, 602 (1988) (footnote omitted). For a game-theoretic dis

cussion of precisely this type of government opportunism in the context of utility regulation,
see Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitment and the Regulatory Pro
cess, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 73 (1992).
68. See Blackmon & Zeckhauser, supra note 67. In future research, I plan to analyze a
number of specific cases of government opportunism in contexts other than federal income
tax law and to emphasize the importance of taking into account default-premium effects. For
example, one prominent instance of government opportunism involves the circumstances sur
rounding California's Proposition 103, the referendum passed in the fall of 1988 that ordered
the rollback in liability and certain other insurance rates in California. This referendum gen
erated an enormous amount of litigation and scholarly attention. See, e.g., Calfarm Ins. Co.
v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989); Steven D. Sugarman, California's Insurance Regu
lation Revolution: The First Two Years ofProposition 103, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 683 (1990).
One could plausibly argue that the insurance companies who were induced to enter the Cali
fornia insurance markets in reliance on the assumption that the prevailing regulatory struc
ture would remain in force (a structure that allowed the insurers to charge premiums that
cover their costs) were victims of opportunism at the hands of the State of California as a
result of the mandatory rate rollbacks. My concern is that the California voters, in making
such a radical change in their insurance-regulatory regime, may have failed to consider ade
quately the default-premium effects. To be specific, query the extent to which California
voters understood and took into account the possibility that, following the rate rollbacks, it
would become much more difficult to get insurers to write business in California.
69. Keep in mind, however, that, with respect to all of these examples (including incen
tive subsidies and government contracts) if it can be shown that the default-premium effect is
relatively small, the efficient transition policy may be to provide no transition relief: no
grandfather treatment, no contract damages, nothing.
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Incentive Subsidies in the Internal Revenue Code

Tue Internal Revenue Code has for many years contained a
number of incentive subsidies. Tue Code currently, for example,
includes numerous incentive credits: the low-income housing
credit,10 the targeted jobs credit,71 the enhanced oil recovery

credit,72 the disabled access credit,73 the renewable electricity pro
duction credit,74 the Indian employment credit,75 the empowerment
zone employment credit,76 the research credit,77 and the alcohol
fuel credit,78 to name just a few. Perhaps the best-known example
of an incentive tax credit is the investment tax credit (IT C), which

has been used by Congress as an instrument of policymaking off

and on for many years and which was repealed in 1986.79 Indeed,
all of the credits listed above were designed expressly by Congress

to increase the level of taxpayer investment in a specific asset or

activity.

In addition to the numerous incentive tax credits, the Code con
tains many deductions and exclusions that could easily be under
stood as incentive subsidies. For example, the Code permits
accelerated-depreciation deductions for certain types of tangible as

sets that are either used in a trade or business or held for the pro

duction of income.8° Furthermore, the Code gives taxpayers the
70. I.R.C.§ 42 (1996).
71. I.R.C.§ 51 (1996).
72. I.R.C.§ 43 (1996).
73. I.R.C.§ 44 (1996).
74. I.R.C.§ 45 (1996).
75. I.R.C.§ 45A (1996).
76. I.R.C.§ 1396 (1996).
77. I.R.C.§ 41 (1996).
78. I.R.C.§ 40 (1996). These credits are combined into a general-business credit for the
purpose of computing how much of each credit will be allowed in a given year and in car
ryback and carryover years. See I.R.C.§§ 38(b)-39 (1996).
79.
The (investment] credit was first enacted in 1962 in connection with that year's liber
alization of depreciation rules to stimulate purchases of new machinery and equipment
to bolster a lagging economy. Since 1962, the credit has been utilized as an instrument
of fiscal policy. The investment credit was increased in 1964, removed in 1966, reinstated
in 1967, repealed in 1969, reinstituted in 1971, temporarily increased in 1975, "perma
nently increased" in 1978, reduced in 1982 and repealed once again in 1986. Although
the repeal of the investment tax credit was used in 1986 to finance a large share of the
revenue cost of reducing the top corporate tax rate from 46 to 34 percent, its history
suggests that it would be foolish to regard the investment tax credit as a dead letter for
the future.
GRAETZ, supra note 50, at 407.
80. Taxpayers have long been able to take depreciation deductions to account for the
"exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)" of assets
used in a trade or business or held for the production of income. I.R.C. § 167 (1996). In
1981, Congress enacted the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), which replaced the
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option to "expense" (that is, to deduct immediately) the cost of in
vesting in specific types of tangible business property.s1 Taxpayers
who invest in mines, oil and gas wells, and other natural deposits
get the benefit of "percentage-depletion" deductions, which can
produce a large subsidy for such investments.82 A number of provi
sions in the Code also provide accelerated amortization for specific
types of investments, for example, the five-year amortization de

ductions for the cost of pollution-control facilities83 and for certain
research-and-development

expenditures84

and

the

seven-year

amortization deductions for certain qualified reforestation expendi
tures.85 In addition, the home-mortgage-interest deduction,86 the

charitable-contribution deduction,87 and the exclusion for interest
received on state and local bonds88 all could be understood as in
centive subsidies. Indeed, all of these deductions and exclusions (as
well as the credits listed above) are designed to increase taxpayers'

level of investment in certain types of assets and activities and thus
easily can be understood as substitutes for direct government
contracting.89
With respect to any of these tax provisions, the framework of
this article suggests that Congress should adopt a policy of provid
ing guaranteed grandfather treatment should the provisions be re
pealed or substantially reduced. At this point, it might be argued
that, because every aspect of the tax laws affects taxpayers' incenpre-1981 depreciation rules with respect to most tangible property. The accelerated deduc
tions permitted under ACRS had the effect of increasing the after-tax rate of return on in
vestment in qualifying depreciable property, thereby giving taxpayers an incentive to
increase their level of investment in such assets. In fact, when the Tax Reform of 1986 re
placed the ACRS with the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MA,CRS), one of its
principal motivations was to reduce the effect on investment incentives. See 2 U.S. TREAS
URY DEPT., REPORT TO THE I'REsIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECO
NOMIC GROWTH 154-57 (1984) ("The low or negative effective tax rates on ACRS property
and the tax deferral resulting from accelerated depreciation allowances distort investment
decisions in a variety of ways."). See generally GRAETZ, supra note 50, at 392
("(D]epreciation allowances have long been used to adjust the overall level of investment in
plant and equipment for fiscal policy reasons.").
'
81. See I.R.C. § 179 (1996). A limit is placed on the total amount a taxpayer can expense
under § 179 in a given tax year. The current limit is $17,500. See I.R.C. § 179 (b)(l) (1996).
82. See I.R.C. §§ 611-14 (1996).
83. See I.R.C. § 169 (1996).
84. See I.R.C. § 174(b) (1996).
85. See l.R.C. § 194 (1996).
86. See I.R.C. §§ 163(a), (h)(3) (1996).
87. See I.R.C. § 170 (1996).
88. See I.R.C. § 103 (1996).
89. For an extensive list of incentive-subsidy provisions, see generally JoINT CoMM. ON
TAXATION, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., ESTIMATES OF TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS
1995-99 (Comm. Print 1994).
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tives to some extent, all tax laws can be characterized plausibly as

On this theory, it is misleading to analyze a relatively
small set of credits, deductions, and exclusions. Fair enough.

subsidies.

Whenever there is an inconsistency in the tax treatment of two
comparable types of investments there will be an effect on taxpay
ers' investment decisions, and that inconsistency can be called a
subsidy or a penalty, depending on one's starting point. For exam
ple, the introduction of the income tax itself might alter taxpayers'
decisions regarding how they will allocate their resources as be
tween work and leisure. Thus,

if

the substitution effect were to

overwhelm the income effect, the income tax could, in a sense, be
seen as a subsidy of leisure.
Applying the term "incentive subsidy" to all tax provisions,
however, would rendeF the term empty and unhelpful. The object

of this Part of the article is to identify a class of tax laws that most

resemble a contract because such provisions give rise to the most
serious default-premium problems. In other words, my contention
is that incentive-subsidy provisions such as the ones listed in the

text have much greater incentive effects than do most changes in
marginal income tax rates, unless the rate changes are extremely
large.90
As I explain more fully in Part IV below, however, to the extent

incentive effects become a problem in connection \vith tax-rate
changes and other broad-based types of tax transitions, the argu
ments in this section would apply. In such situations, the use of
transition relief should at least be considered. In connection with
changes in income tax rates, however, incentive effects and thus de
fault premiums are probably not the pivotal issues. Rather, in those
contexts, distributional concerns become determinative.

90. It is still true, however, that some of the provisions I have listed as incentive tax
subsidies might be better characterized differently. For example, the home-mortgage-interest
deduction may be understood best, not as being designed to induce higher levels of home
ownership, but rather as being designed to reduce the effective tax rate on middle- and high
income taxpayers. If the latter characterization is more accurate, and the home-mortgage
interest deduction is not primarily an incentive subsidy, we may be less concerned about
default-premium effects in the event of a repeal. In my view, this deduction (more so than
most provisions) has substantial incentive and distributional effects.
Interestingly, these two effects are importantly related; they pull in opposite directions. If
the deduction has a large incentive effect (causing more taxpayers to buy homes) the distri·
butional effect may be diminished because of the putative tax that results when the tax
induced in�ntive increase in demand for housing produces higher housing prices.
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POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO GUARANTEED
GRANDFATHERING

The Graetz-Kap/ow "Government-Risk" Theory

The conclusion from Part II - that repeals of or reductions in
incentive subsidies should be accompanied by full transition relief
- contradicts the Graetz-Kaplow government-risk theory. The
Graetz-Kaplow position is simple yet powerful: Just as the govern
ment does not generally provide insurance to private investors for
market contingencies (such as the risk of a change in consumer
preferences or a change in the cost of some input), it should not
irisure them against the risk of change in government policy. Under
this view, market risk and government risk are indistinguishable,
and, to achieve efficiency, investors must be forced to take both
types of risk into account when making investment decisions.
Therefore, the efficient transition policy in terms of its effects on
incentives would be to provide no transition relief. Under such a
policy, taxpayers making investment decisions would be induced to
take into account not only the risk of changes in inflation rates or in
the business cycle but also changes in the federal income tax laws.
Kaplow summarizes this argument as follows: "If one accepts
the common belief that government relief of market risk is gener
ally undesirable because the market usually operates efficiently, or
at least that government relief would be no better, then one should
conclude that mitigation of government risks is economically unjus
tifiable. "91 He goes on to argue that "new rules" (such as new fed
eral income tax provisions) should be made immediately applicable
to all pretransition investments with no grandfather treatment.92
Indeed, Kaplow would provide no transition relief whatever, as
" [t]ransitional relief constitutes an externality that disrupts the mar
ket's response to the risk imposed by uncertainty concerning future
government action."93
Graetz, who made essentially the same point nine years earlier,
states the argument in a way that stands in stark contrast to the
thesis of this article. He contends that a taxpayer's reliance on an
existing tax-law provision cannot form the basis of an argument for
transition relief precisely because, in Graetz's view, the contract
analogy is inapt. This analogy supposedly fails because taxpayers
91. Kaplow, supra note 10, at 535.
92. See id. at 5fl/ ("[Tax subsidies] typically should not be designed so as to incorporate
grandfathering, because it generally is undesirable.").
93. Id. at 551.
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should take into account the possibility that tax law will change
over time; therefore, reliance on any given tax provision "should be
tempered by the subjective probability that the law will be
altered. "94
In the context of government contracts and incentive-subsidy
provisions, however, the Graetz-Kaplow analysis does not produce
a general rule against transition relief.95 This is because the risk
that the government will breach a contract or repeal an incentive
subsidy provision without providing transition relief differs from
market risks. One of the principal functions served by any contract
is to allocate risks between the contracting parties. If the agree
ment is fully and efficiently specified, each of the various risks in
herent in the transaction will be allocated to the least-cost insurer.
The least-cost insurer will be either the party who can eliminate the

risk at lowest cost or, if the loss is unpreventable, the party who can
most efficiently allocate the unpreventable risk either by purchasing
insurance or by self-insuring. In addition to allocating risk, how
ever, the contract serves another important function: to prevent
either party from acting opportunistically. This function, too, can
be put in risk-allocation terms; that is, the fully and efficiently speci

fied contract would allocate the risk of opportunism to the opportu
nist.96 Thus, applying the Graetz-Kaplow framework,

if failure

to

provide transition relief (either in the form of contract damages or
grandfather treatment) would amount to opportunism on the part
of the government, efficiency would require that such relief be
provided.

B.

The Distinction Between Opportunistic and Nonopportunistic
Legal Transitions
What

if Congress

decides to repeal an incentive subsidy nomi

nally retroactively, but for nonopportunistic reasons? That is, the
government repeals the provision not because, having induced the
desired level of taxpayer investment, it now wants to use on other
projects. Rather, Congress repeals the subsidy primarily because it
has determined that the subsidy was a mistake from the beginning.
For example, Congress learns that the targeted investment (low
income

housing,

nuclear

power,

oil-and-gas

exploration,

or

94. Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 26, at 1651.
95. Below I discuss one type of transition {the mistake case) where the government-risk
argument, on incentive grounds, may call for no transition relief.
96. See POSNER, supra note 61, at 79-81.
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whatever) causes more social harm than good, and therefore the
subsidy never should have been enacted.
In the nonopportunism situation (which I sometimes refer to as
the government-mistake case), the government-risk theory would
call for a transition policy of no relief because such a policy would
place the risk of transition losses resulting from nonopportunistic
changes in policy directly on investors. Kaplow illustrates this con
clusion with two simple examples, one involving the taking of pri
vate land for public use and the other involving the banning of a
product:
Suppose there is a substantial chance that land will be taken and lev
eled for a highway and that a product will be found hazardous and
will therefore be banned. Should these events occur, investments in
improvements on the land and in manufacturing equipment to pro
duce the product would be rendered worthless. Accordingly, ex post,

it might well have been socially preferable for the landowner and the
manufacturer not to have made the investments in the first place.91

Note how these examples of legal transitions differ from transi
tions owing to government opportunism. In the opportunism case,
it is efficient to place the risk of opportunistic behavior on the op
portunist; so it is efficient to place the risk of government opportu
nism on the government. In the case where the government
discovers new facts revealing that its original decision was a bad
idea, however, whether the risk of transition losses should be left on
individual investors to allocate through private markets or should
be borne by the government via transition relief turns on the an
swer to the follO\ving question: Who is the more efficient bearer of
the risk of government mistakes, the government itself or the pri
vate parties?9S Kaplow provides an elaborate argument for why ef
ficiency generally requires that government risk be borne directly
by private parties rather than by the government, to optimize the
private parties' ex ante investment incentives.99 That argument is
most persuasive, however, with respect to certain types of situa
tions. For example, consider the case of the product ban mentioned
in the quotation above. In that situation, one could quite plausibly
argue that the product manufacturer should be required to bear the
risk that its product might someday be banned by the government
97. Kaplow, supra note 10, at 529 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. at
551, 573 (drawing a distinction between mistake cases, where nominal retroactivity is appro
priate, and change-of-circumstance cases, where nominal prospectivity is appropriate).
98. The allocation of the risk of a government mistake presents issues similar to those
that gave rise to the contract doctrines of mistake, impossibility, and frustration. See
FRIEDRICH KEssLER ET AL., CoNTRAcrs ch. 8 (1986).
99. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 536-50.
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for health-and-safety reasons. After all, it is the manufacturer who
typically has the best access to information regarding the relative
safety of the products it plans to produce. Further, we want the
manufacturer, when deciding whether to manufacture a given prod
uct, to consider all of the possible health-and-safety issues involved,
and we do not want the manufacturer to externalize potential
hazards onto the government.100 Put simply, it is easy to believe
that a product manufacturer is the least-cost insurer with respect to
this type of legal transition.
It is less plausible, however, that taxpayers are the least-cost in
surers against the risk that the government will repeal a mistaken
incentive subsidy. In that situation, one would expect the govern
ment to be the superior insurer; we typically want the government
to bear the risk that its decision to enact a given subsidy will prove
to have been a mistake. Additionally, making the government bear
the risk that the incentive subsidy will tum out to be a bad idea will
induce lawmakers to engage in a more careful cost-benefit analysis
before enacting the incentive subsidy in the first place. Thus, the
government-risk analysis does not unambiguously favor a transition
policy of no relief in the context of incentive-subsidy transitions
that are cases of government mistake; it may even favor a transition
policy of full transition relief in such situations.

This conclusion is consistent with the treatment of nonoppor
tunistic government mistakes in the government-contract setting. If
the government enters into a contract that it later determines to be
a bad idea, it may decide not to make such contract� in the future.
It still, however, must comply with the old contract or else pay dam
ages. That is, contract law applies even when the government
makes a bad deal. Presumably, our decision to apply such a rule in
the context of government contracts and to maintain that rule for so
many years derives from our conclusion (albeit implicit) that the
least-cost insurer of government opportunism is the government.
To the extent that the same reasoning applies to the case of
incentive-subsidy provisions, the optimal transition policy therefore
is to provide guaranteed grandfather protection, irrespective of the
government's reason for enacting the change.
All of the foregoing arguments apply as well when the repeal of
the incentive subsidy or the breach of a government contract is mo
tivated, not by the government's discovery of new facts, but by a
change in the government itself. For example, imagine that Con100. See id.
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gress were initially controlled by one of the dominant political par
ties, during which time a number of incentive-subsidy provisions
designed to increase the level of taxpayer investment in certain ac
tivities (for example, low-income housing or research and develop
ment) were enacted. Then comes a dramatic shift in the political
landscape; the minority party gains control of the legislature and
decides to repeal the newly enacted incentive subsidies. In such a
situation, the newly constituted legislature, according to the argu
ment developed in Part II, should be bound to provide grandfather
treatment to those who invested in reliance on the old incentive
subsidies, so as to minimize the default-premium effect as well as
general disenchantment with the government for not keeping its
promises. This conclusion may be most intuitive in the case of gov
ernment contracts. If, for example, the old Congress were to enter
into contracts with private parties or with other governments, the
new Congress should not be able to terminate those contracts at

will without providing compensation. As I have already discussed,
we do in fact require our government to comply with basic contract
principles even when the there is a shift in political power.101 One
of the principal goals of this article is to emphasize that point and to
suggest that the same presumption should be applied to all incen
tive subsidies.
Professor Kaplow contends that, when a transition is motivated
by a change in the government or by a change in the voters' prefer
ences (which amounts to the same thing), the efficient transition
policy is indeterminate.102 In one sense, I agree. As argued above,
whether binding the government to its promises (promises in the
form of explicit contracts or incentive subsidies) will prove efficient
is ultimately an empirical question on which there is essentially no
direct data. However, our decision to adopt such a rule in the con
text of government contracts is uncontroversial presumably because
of the default-premium concerns and government-legitimacy con
cerns discussed in Part II. The same rule should apply to incentive
subsidies in the tax code.
101. That the government generally must comply with its contractS does not mean that
one legislature has unlimited power to bind future legislatures. For example, the Supreme
Court has long held that a current state legislature cannot contract to constrain a future
legislature's police power or power of eminent domain. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814
(1880). States, however, frequently enter into contracts restricting their future taxing power.
These are called tax abatements, and they are a common method by which states compete for
corporate relocations. See Andy Zipser, Civil War, Round Two, BARRON'S, April 3, 1995, at
23 (discussing the growing use of tax abatements by states to lure corporations into the state).
102. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 573.
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One could plausibly argue that an exception to this transition
policy should be made in the case of incentive-subsidy transitions
that are motivated primarily by the desire to redistribute wealth
from the former beneficiaries of the subsidy to the federal fisc. As
Graetz puts the point: "Grandfathering a change which is moti
vated by a desire to increase the tax burden on the class of persons
who have enjoyed a tax incentive is much like passing a law to re
distribute wealth and requiring compensation to those from whom

the wealth was distributed."103 In such a situation, we face a trade
off between incentive concerns and distributional concerns.
Again, the government-contract example is instructive.

We

would not generally allow the government to walk away from a
contract with a private party without paying damages, even if the
private party is wealthy and the contract damages (instead of being
paid as contract damages) could be redistributed to more deserving
souls. Redistribution of that sort usually is done with a broader
brush, through broad-based tax-rate increases and direct subsidies.
Such broad-based transitions do not give rise to the same degree of
default premiums that would accompany an opportunistic breach of
contract or retroactive incentive-subsidy transition. 104
C.

The Slippery-Slope Objections

Another set of objections to the transition policy of providing
full relief in cases of incentive-subsidy transitions is based on the
claim that such a policy contains no logical limits and is therefore
unworkable. As I argue in this section, however, these objections
can be resolved by reference to the government-contract example.
The first slippery-slope objection is this: If one is persuaded
that the default-premium effect presents a serious concern, why
should transition relief be provided only to the "nominal benefi
ciaries" of the incentive subsidy, that is, only to the taxpayers who
claimed the credit, deduction, or exclusion on their tax returns.
Shouldn't transition relief be provided to all parties who made in
vestments in reliance on the subsidy, including those who benefited

103. Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 82.
104. Still, Graetz's general point regarding redistributive tax transitions is well taken, and
it is an important point for those incentive-subsidy transitions that affect large classes of
taxpayers and that begin to have the characteristics of a nonsubsidy tax transition, such as
rate increases. See infra Part IV and supra note 9.
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from the subsidy only indirectly? Professor Graetz illustrates this
criticism with the following example:
[I]n the case of an exemption for state and local bond interest, advo
cates of compensation to losers would compensate only the holders of
tax-exempt bonds. It has not been suggested, however, that issuers of
tax-exempt bonds, who may well have structured their financing plans
on the expectation that exempt status would continue into the future,
are entitled to continuation of the tax exemption because of their "re
liance" interest. Nor has it been argued that those who demanded or
supplied substitutes, on the assumption that the exemption would
continue, should also be protected. If the fairness of change depends
upon individual reliance, all persons who might be expected to have
altered behavior because of a particular tax rule must be protected.ms

There are a number of responses to this objection. First, it is
true that indirect beneficiaries of an incentive subsidy can suffer
transition losses when the subsidy is repealed; it is also true that
grandfathering the repeal of the provision will not necessarily pro

vide transition relief for those parties. Therefore, if the incentive
subsidy has had a desirable effect on the incentives of those indirect
beneficiaries and an effect that is sufficiently large that Congress
wants to protect it, transition relief (perhaps in the form of direct
compensation) may be appropriate. Such a policy would be fully
consistent with the thesis of this article. What is more likely, how
ever, is that the incentive benefits are relatively small when com
pared to the costs of the compensation system that would be
required. (Imagine the difficulty that Congress would encounter at
tempting to evaluate the validity of the claims brought for compen
sation by all the parties who purport to be indirect beneficiaries of a
given incentive subsidy that is slated for repeal.) Thus, the efficient
transition policy with respect to incentive-subsidy provisions proba
bly is full transition relief to nominal beneficiaries of the subsidy in
the form of grandfathered effective dates and no relief for indirect
beneficiaries.
This transition policy would be consistent with the rules that ap
ply to government contracts. As discussed in Part II, when the gov
ernment breaches a contract it must pay damages to the
nonbreaching party. It normally will not be required, however, to

pay damages to third parties who suffer losses as a result of the
breach. Under basic principles of contract law, for a nonparty to a

105. Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 26, at 1651.
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contract to recover damages, it must qualify as a third-party

beneficiary.106

A second slippery-slope objection to a transition policy of guar
anteed grandfather treatment is based on the following claim:
There is no meaningful distinction between incentive subsidies that
have been enacted and those that have been proposed but not en
acted. For example, to support his claim that "[i]ndividual reliance
on the status quo simply will not suffice as a basis for compensation
or grandfathered effective dates," Graetz offers the following
hypothetical:
Consider a situation in which the President announces a program to
subsidize a certain activity through income tax deductions or credits,
for example, tax credits for the insulation of homes. Members of
Congress crucial to the passage of the legislation make speeches em
bracing the proposal. A company engaged in the manufacture of
home insulation materials, in reliance on these statements, purchases
additional machinery to manufacture insulation. If the legislation is
never enacted and the manufacturer loses, should his losses be com
pensated or should he be otherwise protected? Does the fact that the
legislation passes both Houses of Congress but is not signed by the
President alter the result? Why, then, is the repeal of legislation en
acted one year earlier thought to present a more compelling case for
compensating reliance? Should those who failed to invest in insula
tion on the assumption that the legislation would not be enacted also
be protected?107

This argument, too, seems to miss the mark. First, although
Graetz intimates to the contrary, it may be the case that Congress
will sometimes want to use public promises of future, yet-to-be
enacted incentive subsidies as a means of altering taxpayers' incen
tives. If so, we should consider the costs and benefits of providing
transition relief to investors who make investments in reliance on
such promises. However, because of the administrative costs that
would accompany an effort to identify those who suffered such reli
ance losses, the optimal scope of transition relief probably is limited
to compensating those who have made investments in reliance on
the subsidy only after the subsidy has been enacted. This limitation
would be analogous to the doctrine of "consideration" in contract
106. See generally KESSLER ET AL., supra note 98, at ch. 11 (reviewing the law of third
party beneficiaries). It is worth noting that in recent years courts have been increasingly
willing to allow claims brought by parties alleging to be third-party beneficiaries of govern
ment contracts. See id. at 1384-418; see also Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Prom
ise: A Study ofthe Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985) (connecting
the development of third-party-beneficiary doctrine in the context of government contracts
to the rise of "new property" concepts pioneered by Charles Reich).
107. Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 78.
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law, which serves the function of providing evidence of the parties'
intent to be bound.1os
D.

The Analogy to Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts

Part H's use of the contract analogy and its argument in favor of
guaranteed grandfather treatnient for incentive-subsidy provisions

may also be subject to the following attack: Even if one. concedes
that an incentive-subsidy provision has important characteristics

that are similar to the characteristics of a government contract, the
contract analogy itself does not provide an efficiency-based justifi
cation for guaranteed grandfathering. According to this argument,
an incentive subsidy that is accompanied by a guarantee of grandfa
ther protection is akin to a long-term contract; whereas, an incen
tive subsidy without such a guarantee is akin to a short-term
contract. In present-value terms, the argument goes, such contracts
are equivalent. Thus, the effect of transition policies on default pre
miums is irrelevant to the question whether Congress should prom
ise to provide transition relief. That question should instead be
answered on different grounds.
This argument is derived from the article on tax transitions by
Professors Ramseyer and Nakazato.109
[T]hink of tax legislation as a "contract" between investors and the
state, and consider what the "price" of this contract would be. The
contractual analogy follows from Congress's offering tax benefits in
return for taxpayers' agreements to make specified investments. By
urging Congress to abandon grandfather clauses, Graetz and Kaplow
argue that the optimal contract is one with a short (and indefinite)
term: The state promises to keep the tax benefits only until it finds a
way to improve the law. If the state instead vows to grandfather ex
isting projects, it adopts a long term contract: a promise to continue
the benefits for the life of the project. Note, however, that the price
of the contract will be the same in both cases. After all, risk-neutral
investors primarily care about the expected net present value of the
-

108. See KEssLER ET AL, supra note 98, at ch. 5.
109. Ramseyer and Nakazato, it turns out, favor guaranteed grandfather treatment for
incentive-subsidy transitions but for reasons different from those argued here. They rely on
the following theory: that a policy of promising grandfathering to those who rely on
incentive-subsidy provisions would reduce the amount of social resources spent lobbying
against the repeal of tax subsidies in situations in which such a repeal would be efficient. See
Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 12, at 1171-72; id. at 1174 ("Under a tax-guaranteed re
gime, investors will not care whether Congress revokes their tax-favored status; under a tax
contingent strategy, they will care dearly. Accordingly, under the former they will lobby and
bribe less than under the latter, and to the extent that happens, society gains."). In this
article, I ignore the effect of alternative transition policies on lobbying expenditures.
Ramseyer and Nakazato's arguments with respect to that question, though, seem facially
plausible and therefore provide another justification for a credible government commitment
to grandfather any changes to an incentive-subsidy provision.
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tax benefits they gain from an investment; they will rarely care
whether Congress packages benefits of equal net value in long- or
short-term contracts.110

This argument, however, misunderstands the significance of the
contract analogy. First, any incentive subsidy that provides benefits
to taxpayers over a period of years rather than all at once (which I
have called an "installment subsidy") cannot be akin to a short
term contract. Such an incentive subsidy is either akin to a long
term contract (if the government commits to provide transition re
lief should the subsidy be repealed) or it is not (if the government
does not so commit). Thus, at least with respect to installment
incentive subsidies, the relevant question is whether the benefits of
such a commitment exceed the costs. Part II argues that there is
reason to believe the answer typically will be "yes."
Second, if the government were to adopt a policy of zero transi
tion relief (that is, the law could be changed at any time and the
change would be made nominally retroactive) such a situation
would not be analogous to a government contract at all, short-term
or long-term. It would instead be analogous to an empty, unen
forceable government promise. Part II illustrates how such
promises, in the absence of any precommitment on the part of the
government, would give rise to large default premiums, as taxpay
ers would come to expect opportunism on the part of the govern
ment. For reasons that are not fully explained in the article,
however, Ramseyer and Nakazato implicitly assume that the reduc
tion in default premiums resulting from a policy of guaranteed
grandfathering is never greater than the loss of government flexibil
ity but rather that the two effects are always perfectly offsetting.
That is extremely unlikely. Indeed, if it were so, in the government
contract setting, we would generally be indifferent as to whether the
government kept its contractual promises or not. To the contrary,
in the context of government contracts, we have decided to assume
that default-premium concerns trump government-flexibility con
cerns; hence, the application of contract law to the government.
IV.
A.

OTHER TYPES OF TAX TRANSITIONS

The Correction of Obvious Legislative Errors

Parts II and III argued that, With respect to the repeal of incen
tive subsidies, the optimal transition policy would be one that
promises full transition relief in the form of grandfathered effective
110. Id. at 1167.
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dates. It may be efficient, however, to permit an exception to this
policy in a narrow class of cases in which the repealed or revised
provision contains an obvious error.111 The exception would take
the form of the following transition policy: If there is a provision in
the Code that some taxpayers interpret in a manner that generates
extraordinarily large tax savings, and if there is strong evidence that

Congress never intended the provision to be interpreted in that
manner, then, if the provision is repealed or amended to eliminate
the taxpayers' aggressive interpretation-, the change will apply nom

inally retroactively. Thus, taxpayers who take advantage of such a
provision do so at their own risk, and any tax savings they enjoy

because of it will be recaptured retroactively if the provision is later
repealed.112
Such a rule would increase the incentive for taxpayers (and tax
counsel) to interpret the tax laws in good faith.113 One might object
to this policy on the ground that most individual taxpayers are rela
tively unsophisticated and therefore cannot be expected to distin
guish the tax loopholes that Congress intends from the ones it does

not. If that is a substantial concern, the transition policy proposed
in this Part could be narrowed even further to apply only to situa111. The distinction that I draw between obvious legislative error (discussed in this sec
tion) and government mistake (discussed in section III.B above) is akin to the distinction in
contract Jaw between the treatment of obvious typographical errors in written contracts and
the treatment of unilateral mistakes.
112. Mcintyre suggests something similar to this policy: "When Congress amends the
Code to correct what is generally regarded as an unintended defect in the statute, no special
transition rules are justified." Mcintyre, supra note 15, at 13. The transition policy that I
would apply to corrections of obvious errors, in contrast, would entail a special transition
rule. It would apply the correction nominally retroactively. Also, Mcintyre does not discuss
the difficulty of distinguishing transitions that are corrections of obvious errors from those
that are (to use my term) "opportunistic." Kaplow contends that arguments for an obvious
error exception of the sort I have described serve merely to illustrate the benefits of his
proposed rule: nominal retroactivity for all transitions. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 608-09.
In my view, the obvious-error exception is understood best as an exception, not as a rule.
113. Note that the Code already contains specific penalty provisions designed to induce
taxpayers to interpret the tax rules reasonably and in good faith. For example, the tax
return-accuracy penalty, found in § 6662, imposes a 20% penalty on any portion of an un
derpayment of tax that is attributable to, among other things, negligence or disregard of rules
or regulations or a substantial understatement of income tax liability (in the absence of "sub
stantial authority" for the taxpayer's position). See I.R.C. § 6662(b) (1996). Note, however,
that no accuracy-related penalty is imposed under this section with respect to any portion of
the underpayment for which the taxpayer can establish that she had a "reasonable cause"
and that she acted in good faith. See I.R.C. § 6664(c) (1996). Thus, the accuracy penalties
would not apply in the context of an obvious legislative error, as I have defined that term.
That is, when Congress has unintentionally but unambiguously enacted a loophole, there is
no question that the taxpayer has reasonable cause for her position, as that term is under
stood by the Service and by the courts. In this section, however, I am suggesting that,
although taxpayers who take aggressive positions in reliance on obvious legislative errors do
not risk accuracy-related penalties, if such provisions are then repealed by Congress, the
repeal should be made nominally retroactive.
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tions in which the taxpayer can be expected to have sophisticated
tax counsel. For example, it could be limited to tax transitions af
fecting corporations.
Distinguishing error-correction transitions, which will be ap
plied nominally retroactively, from incentive-subsidy transitions,
which will give rise to full transition relief in the form of
grandfathered effective dates, will sometimes present a challenge.
Still, there may be criteria that can assist in drawing the distinction.
For example, perhaps there should be a presumption that the error

correction exception will not apply if the provision being repealed
has been in effect for a number of years. Thus, if Congress decides
to repeal a provision that has been in the Code for many years, the

repeal clearly should not be made nominally retroactive to the ear
liest years in which the provision was in effect. This gives Congress
an incentive to make such corrections as soon as the error is discov
ered. Such corrections occur quite frequently in tax legislation, and
they are often packaged together in so-called Technical Corrections
bills. Furthermore, perhaps there should be a rebuttable presump

if not a guarantee, that such a repeal would be grandfathered.
In addition, if the Treasury Department issues regulations or the

tion,

Internal Revenue Service issues a ruling interpreting a given Code
section in a manner

consistent with

taxpayers' "aggressive" inter

pretation, and Congress later repeals that section or amends it in a
way inconsistent with Treasury's interpretation, the repeal should
not be applied nominally retroactively. Instead, the repeal should
be grandfathered or at least made nominally prospective. By the
same token, if the Treasury Department issues an interpretation of
a Code section that is inconsistent with taxpayers' aggressive inter
pretation, and Congress later changes the section to close the loop
hole, there is an even stronger argument for making that change
nominally retroactive, at least retroactive to the date on which the
Treasury interpretation was first issued and perhaps retroactive to
the date of enactment of the original provision.
Admittedly, enforcing a general transition policy of grandfather
ing incentive-subsidy transitions while simultaneously maintaining a
policy of nominal retroactivity for transitions designed to close ob
viously unintended loopholes will create difficulties. Taxpayers lob
bying Congress for transition relief in connection with the repeal of
some provision will inevitably argue that their provision falls under
the rule rather than the exception. Although drawing lines in some
cases may prove difficult, the gain from line drawing probably ex-

-
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ceeds the cost, especially if the exception for legislative corrections
is kept extremely narrow and is applied only in egregious cases.
This transition policy for situations involving corrections of ob
vious legislative errors can be seen in the following example. As
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress enacted an estate-tax
provision that was designed to create an incentive for owners of
corporations (more precisely, for the estates of deceased corporate
shareholders) to sell their stock in the corporation to the company's
employees rather than to outsiders or the corporation.114 Thus, the
provision created a deduction for half of the proceeds of "any sale
of employer securities by the executor of an estate" to "an em
ployee stock ownership plan [ESOP]."115 The problem, however,
was that the provision contained no requirement that the decedent
have owned the stock in question to qualify for the special ESOP
deduction. As a result, soon after the enactment of this provision,
many executors of large estates immediately began purchasing
stock in corporations that had ESOPs and then immediately resel
ling the shares to the ESOPs. Because the estates could then de
duct half the sale proceeds on their estate-tax return, the estates
were able to reduce their tax burdens dramatically.
Congress was taken by surprise. It had clearly not intended the
use of the ESOP deduction in connection with shares purchased
after the death of the decedent shareholders. Evidence of Con
gress's surprise can be seen in the contrast between Congress's ini
tial projections regarding the amount of tax revenue that the ESOP
provision would cost (approximately $300 million over five years)
and the later projections, once Congress learned how taxpayers
were interpreting the provision (upwards of $7 billion).116 There
fore, in February 1987, only a few months after its enactment, Sena
tor Bentsen from Texas introduced an amendment to the provision,
inserting language requiring that, to qualify for the estate-tax de
duction, the securities sold to the ESOP must have been "directly

114. See STAFF OF JoINT CoMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CoNG., 2o SESs., TAX REFORM
TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (ESOPs) 37
(Comm. Print 1985). See generally United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).

PROPOSALS:

115. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2514, amended by Om
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10411(a), 101 Stat. 1330,
1330-433 (repealed 1989).
116. See 133 CoNG. REc. 4145, 4293 (1987). Senator Bentsen stated that "Congress did
not intend for estates to be able to claim the deduction by virtue of purchasing stock in the
market and simply reselling the stock to an ESOP . . . and Congress certainly did not antici
pate a $7 billion revenue loss." Id. at 4294.
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owned" by the · decedent "immediately before death." And this
amendment was passed in December 1987.117
What is most interesting about this tax transition, however, is
that Congress made the amendment, which was enacted in Decem
ber 1987, nominally retroactive to apply to transactions in 1986 as
well as those in 1987. 118 This example of nominal retroactivity is
arguably consistent with the transition policy described above. It is
also worth noting the Internal Revenue Service's response to the
initial enactment of the ESOP provision. On January 5, 1987, only
a few months after the provision was enacted, the Service an
nounced that " [p]ending the enactment of clarifying legislation," it
would interpret · the original provision as

if

the amendment had

been included from the start and thus would allow the ESOP de
duction only for sales of securities that had been owned by the de
cedent at the time of death. 119 Given this announcement by the
Service, the argument for applying the amendment at least to all of
1987 is extremely strong. Moreover,

if one agrees that the taxpay

ers' interpretation of the provision clearly was not what Congress
intended, the argument for applying the amendment to 1986 is
strong as well.

It was the constitutionality of this transition rule that was at is
sue in United States v. Carlton.120 The taxpayer in Carlton had
taken advantage of the estate-tax loophole created by the original
ESOP-deduction provision. In December 1986, the estate of Mr.
Carlton had purchased stock in a corporation only to resell the
stock two days later to the corporation's ESOP, thereby generating
a huge estate-tax deduction. Although the taxpayer sold the stock
to the ESOP at a loss, the transaction produced an enormous profit
after taxes for the taxpayer once the ESOP deduction was taken
into account.121 When the Internal Revenue Service, applying the
amended version of the statute, disallowed the taxpayer's ESOP de
duction, the taxpayer challenged the constitutionality of the nomi-

117. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10411(a),
101 Stat. 1330, 1330-432 (repealed 1989).
118. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10411(b),
101 Stat. 1330 (repealed 1989).
119. I.R.S. Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432, 442.
120. 114 s. Ct. 2018 (1994).
121. The purchase and sale of the stock produced a loss, before taxes, of $631,000. How
ever, applying the ESOP estate-tax deduction, the sale generated tax savings of $2,501,161.
See 114 S. Ct. at 2021.
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nally retroactive effective date, arguing that such retroactivity
violates the Due Process Clause.122
In accordance with a long line of prior cases upholding the con

stitutionality of nominally retroactive tax-law changes,123 the Court
rejected the taxpayer's arguments and upheld Congress's retroac

tive amendment of the ESOP deduction against the due process
challenge. Interestingly, in reaching this conclusion, the Court was

persuaded by the same factors that made this particular tax transi

tion an appropriate occasion for nominal retroactivity: First, Con
gress clearly was acting to correct an obvious mistake and was not
opportunistically repealing an incentive subsidy.124 Second, Con

gress repealed the provision not long after its original enactment;
therefore, the retroactive reach of the statute was short. In fact, the

proposal to amend the provision was made only five months after
the provision was enacted, and the amendment was enacted less
than one year later.125

B.

Broad-Based Tax Transitions

Parts II and III concluded that, with respect to the repeal of an
incentive-subsidy provision, the optimal transition policy would en
tail full transition relief. This section addresses what I refer to as

that is, transitions that affect a relatively
broad group of taxpayers and that have a relatively small default
premium effect. The two specific broad-based tax transitions that I

broad-based tax transitions,

discuss are: (a) an increase in federal income tax rates and (b) the

122. See 114 S. Ct. at 2020.
123. See infra note 131 (discussing retroactive-tax cases).
124.
Congress acted to correct what it reasonably viewed as a mistake in the original
1986 provision that would have created a significant and unanticipated revenue loss.
Ther� is no plausible contention that Congress acted with an improper motive, as by
targeting estate representatives such as Carlton after deliberately inducing them to
engage in ESOP transactions.
Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2023.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor criticizes the majority opinion for relying on
the argument that the amendment clearly was intended to correct a legislative "mistake."
She rightly observes that, at some level, "[e]very law touching on an area in which Congress
has previously legislated can be said to serve the legislative purpose of fixing a perceived
problem with the prior state of affairs." 114 S. Ct. at 2025 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This
argument seems to deny the difference between the repeal of an intended incentive subsidy
and the repeal of a provision that has entirely unintended and unexpected incentive effects
on taxpayers. Obviously, I think there is a difference. Moreover, it may be that the Court's
jurisprudence on retroactive taxation would recognize such a difference as well. The major
ity's opinion at least suggests that the nominally retroactive repeal of an explicit incentive
provision would have a greater chance of violating the due-process standard in this context.
See 1 14 S. Ct. at 2023.
125. See 114 S. Ct. at 2023.
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shift from an income-based tax to a consumption-based tax. For
reasons that are discussed below, these two transitions present a
type of transition problem that is different from the one presented
by the repeal of an incentive subsidy. Hence the optimal transition
policy also may be different.
1. Income Tax Rate Changes
When Congress changes the federal tax rates, it sometimes
makes the rate changes nominally prospective, that is, applicable
only to income earned after the date of enactment or after Decem
ber 31st of the year of enactment. Sometimes, however, it applies
the rate changes nominally retroactively, a practice that in recent
years has led to a fair amount of controversy. For example, as part
of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA),126 signed into
law on August 10th of that year, Congress increased the federal in
come tax rates of the highest-earning individuals and corpora
tions.127 Although the enactment of the rate increase itself did not
get much attention, the effective date that Congress selected ignited
a :firestorm of controversy. The new 1993 tax rates were made ret
roactive to the beginning of the year and thus applied to income
earned before the new rates were enacted and even before the new
administration had taken office.128 Taxpayers and some lawmakers
expressed shock and dismay at this use of nominal retroactivity.129
Although the use of a retroactive effective date in this context is
almost certainly constitutional,130 some critics in the popular press
126. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13001, 107 Stat. 416 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (1996)).
127. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201(a), 107 Stat. 312 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (1996)). Before
the RRA, the top marginal rate, after all "phase outs" and "bubble" effects, had been 31 %.
The RRA in effect added two new marginal rates for individuals: 36% (applied to income
between $140,000 and $250,000 for married couples filing jointly) and 39.6% (applied to in
come over $250,000 for married couples filing jointly). See I.R.C. § l(a) (1996). The new
36% and 39.6% rates have been adjusted for inflation for taxable years since 1994. The RRA
also added a new top bracket for corporations: 35% for income over $10 million. See I.R.C.
§ ll(b)(l)(D) (1996).
128. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201(c), 107 Stat.
416, 459 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (1996)).
129. See, e.g., 139 CoNG. REc. H6392 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Ramstad) ("Mr. Speaker, we have all heard the axiom, 'At least we are safe as long as the
legislature isn't in session.' But it turns out that the American people are never safe. With
passage of the last tax bill, Congress rolled back the clock to a time it was not even in session,
to raise taxes retroactively. For the first time in American history taxes were raised retroac
tive to a previous administration.''); Repeal Retroactivity, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1993, at A14.
130. The Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld retroactive tax legislation against consti
tutional challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986); United States v.
Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938); United States v.
Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937); Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931). According to the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on retroactive federal income taxation, to sur-
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nevertheless questioned the constitutionality of such a practice.131
Moreover, retroactive taxation generally elicits a strong negative
reaction from most taxpayers.132 Despite the controversy, however,

the retroactive rate increase in 1993 was not without precedent.
The Revenue Act of 1938, which was enacted on May 28, 1938 and
which raised the top individual income tax rate from fifty-five to
seventy-five percent, was made applicable to tax years beginning
after December 31, 1938.133 Likewise, the Revenue Act of 1944,

passed on May 29, 1944, which raised the top individual rate from
seventy-five to ninety-one percent and which substantially reduced
the income threshold subject to the top rate, was applied retroac

tively to the beginning of 1944.134

Whether a tax-rate increase is applied nominally prospectively
or nominally retroactively, however, some taxpayers will suffer
losses in the value of investments made in reliance on the old rates.
Thus these questions arise: What is the optimal transition policy
with respect to such losses? Should transition relief be provided?

If so, in what form? Unlike the incentive-subsidy context, where a
strong case can be made for always providing grandfathered effecvive a due process challenge Congress's decision to apply a tax change retroactively need
only pass the "rational-basis" test See United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994); see
also infra section IV.B.1 (describing earlier retroactive rate increases).
131. See, e.g., Stephen C. Glazier, Tax Bill: Retroactive, Unconstitutional . ., WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 5, 1993, at A12 (asserting that a retroactive rate change was unconstitutional).
132. See Levmore, supra note 13, at 265 ("[R]etroactive taxation . . . is generally regarded
as abhorrent, unwise, and even illegal."). We are unlikely to see any additional retroactive
rate increases from Congress in the near future. In January 1995, the House of Representa
tives adopted a change to its rules that prevents consideration of a "bill, joint resolution,
amendment, or conference report carrying a retroactive Federal income tax rate increase."
H. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(b) (1995). Before the adoption of that new House
rule, a number of proposals were introduced that similarly would have limited Congress's
ability to change tax provisions retroactively. See, e.g., H.R. 3024, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (proposing the elimination of the retroactive tax increases in the RRA); H.R.J. Res.
258, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution outlawing
retroactive tax increases); H.R.J. Res. 256, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing an amend
ment to the Constitution to prohibit federal laws from imposing liability for conduct arising
before enactment date); H.R. Res. 247, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (establishing a point of
order under House rules against consideration of measures that contain retroactive tax in
creases). The relevant language of Resolution 258 reads as follows:
Section 1. In the case of any provision of law which modifies the tax laws of the
United States and which results in increased revenues to the United States (1) no such modification of any income tax shall apply to any taxable year beginning
before the date of the enactment of such modification, and
(2) no such modification of any excise tax shall apply to any event occurring before
the date of the enactment of such modification.
H.R.J. Res. 258, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993).
133. See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447 (superceded by I.R.C.
1939).
134. See Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-315, 58 Stat. 231 (superceded
by I.R.C. 1954). These rates do not include the small surtax on "normal income."
.
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tive dates, the optimal policy in the context of a broad-based rate
increase is less clear and seems to tum on a slightly different mix of
issues.
On a practical level, the use of grandfathered effective dates for
a broad-based rate increase is probably out of the question, for sev
eral reasons. First, identifying all of the individual investments that
were made in reliance on the old tax rates and that would therefore
be entitled to grandfather treatment would be impossible. Second,
providing grandfather treatment to everyone who made any type of
investment before the rate change (whether their decision was in
fluenced by expected tax rates or not) would amount to a policy
forbidding any changes in income tax rates. It is hard to imagine
that such a policy would be optimal.
On a theoretical level, the very idea of providing transition re
lief for the losses caused by an income tax rate increase is problem
atic. When Congress adopts a given rate structure, it generally has
two principal purposes in mind: (a) to raise enough money to fund
the level of government services that taxpayers want (whether
those services be public goods or transfer payments) and (b) to allo
cate the cost of those services across taxpayers in a way that is con
sidered fair. Thus, when Congress changes the rate structure, it has
determined either that a different level of revenue is needed or that
a different allocation of the tax burden is appropriate or both. As a
consequence, to provide transition relief for the transition losses
caused by a rate increase would directly contradict Congress's prior
determination regarding the necessary level of revenue and the ap
propriate distribution of the tax burden.13s
For the reasons just described, the use of grandfathered effec
tive dates in the context of broad-based rate increases would almost
certainly be inefficient. The same would be true of a newly enacted
broad-based tax. But that is only the start of the inquiry. The
choice of the optimal effective date (nominally retroactive, nomi
nally prospective, phased-in, or delayed) is much less clear. The
answer depends upon whether those transition devices are neces
sary or helpful in implementing Congress's policy decisions regard
ing the optimal tradeoff between the goals of raising revenue,
obtaining the optimal distribution of the tax burden, and avoiding
harmful incentive effects. Consider the example of an increase in
the top marginal tax rates for individuals. Such a change could
135. Both Graetz and Kaplow make similar observations regarding tax transitions that
are motivated by distributional concerns. See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 82;
Kaplow, s'/,pra note 10, at 519.
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have two general purposes: (a) to raise funds to put toward reduc
ing the federal deficit or to spend on some new government service
and (b) to allocate this additional cost to relatively high-income in
dividuals.136 In addition, this change could also have undesired in
cidental incentive effects. For example, it could lead some
individuals to substitute leisure for work because the after-tax re
turn from working is reduced by the change.137 Not only in choos
ing the size and the structure of the rate increase itself, but also, in
deciding whether to use nominally prospective, phased-in, or
delayed effective dates, Congress will have to balance all of these
effects to achieve the optimal result.

2. Nominally Retroactive Rate Increases: Bolts From the Blue
So when,

if ever,

would it be efficient for Congress to apply a

tax-rate increase nominally retroactively? A retroactive rate in
crease could be efficient if it comes as a surprise to taxpayers. In
fact, to the extent taxpayers do not anticipate the retroactive effec

tive date, a nominally retroactive rate increase will produce greater
allocative efficiency than a nominally prospective rate increase
136. In his 1993 State of the Union Address, President Clinton justified the 1993 rate
increase for high-earning individuals and corporations by emphasizing the need to distribute
the burden of paying off the deficit fairly across all taxpayers. See Ruth Marcus & Ann
Devroy, Asking Americans to "Face Facts," Clinton Presents Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit,
WASH. PoST, Feb. 18, 1993, at Al.
137. Note also that a tax-rate increase can, under certain assumptions, increase rather
than decrease taxpayers' work incentives. This would be true if the "income effect" of the
rate increase overwhelmed the "substitution effect." See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX
POLICY 76 (5th ed. 1987).
There is no a priori basis for deciding how the individual income tax affects work
incentives. On the one hand, the tax reduces the financial rewards of greater effort
and thus tends to discourage work (the substitution effect). On the other hand, it
may provide a greater incentive to obtain more income because it reduces the in
come left for spending (the income effect).
Id. Taking both of these effects into consideration, however, it is quite possible that changes
in federal income tax rates have little net effect on taxpayers' work incentive because the
decisions whether to work, how much to work, and what career to pursue are influenced
primarily by factors other than taxes.
Taxation is only one of many factors affecting work incentives. This makes it ex
tremely difficult to interpret the available statistical evidence or the results of direct
interviews with taxpayers. The evidence suggests that income taxation does not
greatly reduce the amount of labor supplied by workers and managers who are the
primary family earners. Work habits are not easily changed, and for most people
. . . there is little opportunity to vary their hours of work or the intensity of their
efforts in response to changes in tax rates.
Id. Pechman also notes that "secondary earners" in a household have greater opportunity to
vary their work effort in response to tax-rate changes than do "primary earners." He con
cludes, however, that, although the evidence is mixed, "[t]he historical trends in the U.S.
labor supply do not . . . support the view that taxes have had a significant effect on aggregate
labor supply." Id. at 77. Some investment decisions other than the work-leisure tradeoff
probably are influenced significantly by income tax considerations: for example, whether to
invest in taxable or tax-exempt securities.
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would. 11ris is because the retroactive portion of the rate increase
will have no distortive effects on taxpayers' incentives. For exam
ple, it will not distort taxpayers' choice between work and leisure
because it is essentially a surtax on income earned in the past.138
Even the cleverest taxpayers cannot change their past actions.
Then, given the revenue raised by the retroactive portion of the
rate increase, the prospective portion of the rate increase can be
commensurately lower than it otherwise would have been. Thus,
the distortive effects of the prospective rate increase are reduced.
As Professor Levmore puts it, "taxing past transactions means that
future behavior may be less distorted by taxes because the rates
applicable to the future can be lower than without the retroactive
tax."139 On this theory, the 1993 retroactive rate increase may have
been more efficient than a nominally prospective rate increase
designed to produce the same amount of tax revenue would have
been.
The benefits of applying tax-rate increases retroactively, how

ever, should not be overstated. To produce the desired efficiency
effects, Congress would have to promise

credibly

that it would

never enact a retroactive rate increase again or at least not for a
long time. Without such a credible commitment, taxpayers would
alter their behavior in anticipation of future retroactive rate in

creases, thereby reducing and perhaps eliminating the efficiency
benefits of the initial retroactive tax.140 What's more, taxpayers
may be less likely to believe Congress's commitment
the heels of the first surprise retroactive tax.141

if it comes on

138. See Levmore, supra note 13, at 273.
139. Id. Levmore's analysis seems to assume a large one-time retroactive tax that is not
attached to a nominally prospective rate increase. See id. at 276 ("a onetime, large-scale
(progressive) expropriation of private property").
140. Levmore acknowledges this qualification. See id. at 274, 276. He responds, how
ever, that even if the retroactive tax is only a partial surprise (it surprises only some taxpay
ers) there still will be some efficiency gains. See id. True enough. However, having been hit
once with a "bolt from the blue," id. at 277, and knowing that Congress will be tempted to try
the same trick again, taxpayers will begin to watch the sky for the next one. This is the
quintessential example of the time-consistency problem. See Stanley Fischer, Dynamic In
consistency, Cooperation and the Benevolent Dissembling Government, 2 J. EcoN. DYNAMICS
& CoNTROL 93 (1980) (demonstrating the benefits of credible government commitment to
optimal tax-policy plan); Kydland & Prescott, supra note 54. Moreover, given the salience of
the first retroactive tax, taxpayers may have a tendency to overestimate the chance of its
reoccurrence. To avoid these problems, a credible precommitment device is needed. Per
haps the new House rule, adopted by the House of Representatives following the RRA that
prevents consideration of retroactive income tax rate increases, is just such a commitment
device. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
141. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 576 ("To a large degree, expectations concerning fu
ture government policy will depend on past decisions, so consistent action over time can be
quite important in fostering desired expectations.").
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One might expect that the larger the initial retroactive tax is the
harder it would be for Congress to convince taxpayers that it would
not happen again. At the same time, however, the retroactive tax
must be sufficiently large to be worth the trouble. That is, if the
retroactive tax were relatively small, the efficiency benefit would
likewise be small because a small retro-tax would fund only a small
reduction in prospective rates. For example, consider the individual
rate increase included in the RRA 1993, which was only 3.6 per
centage points. It is difficult to imagine that, by applying that rate

increase nominally prospectively, the increase would have needed
to be considerably larger to generate the same amount of revenue.
If, however, the rate increase were extraordinarily large, there

might be efficiency gains to a nominally retroactive effective
date.142 Even then, given the offsetting income and substitution ef
fects, it is unclear whether there would be any efficiency gains.
Moreover,

if we take into account the negative public reaction

to the nominally retroactive rate increase in 1993, and we consider
all the time and resources spent debating the issue and explaining it
to an mcredulous public, the overall costs of the retroactive effec
tive date probably exceed the benefits. In response to taxpayer and
lawmaker complaints about the effective date, some of the revenue
that was generated by the retroactive application of the rate in
crease was given right back to taxpayers via a special transition
relief provision. Under that provision, individuals whose 1993 in
come taxes were increased as a result of the rate change could elect
to pay the additional tax in three equal installments in 1994, 1995,
and 1996.143

3.

The Shift From an Income Tax to a Consumption Tax

The competing concerns of optimal distribution and optjmal in
centives must be balanced not only whenever Congress considers
raising federal income tax rates but also whenever it considers any
sort of broad-based tax transition. Another such transition would
be the shift from the current income tax to a broad-based consump
tion tax. In discussions of the transitional problems· that such a shift
presents, commentators often consider two general types of transi142. For example, the potential efficiency benefits of nominal retroactivity were substan
tially greater with the large rate increases of 1938 and 1944 than with the relatively small rate
increase of 1993. See supra notes 133-34.
143. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201(d), 107 Stat.
416, 459-61 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (1996)).
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"price changes" and "carryover problems."144 The

price-change issue is what I have been discussing all along: what to
do about the reduction in the value of taxpayers' pretransition in
vestments caused by the loss of preferential tax treatment of those
investments. In the shift to a broad-based consumption tax or a so
called fiat tax, many incentive subsidies would presumably be re
pealed. With respect to those transitions, the arguments in Parts II
and III regarding the optimal transition policy would apply. Full
transition relief should be given to the nominal beneficiaries of the
repealed subsidies.
The carryover problem, however, is somewhat different and is
best defined by example. The carryover problem that has received
the most attention involves the question of how to deal with the
following situation: Under an income tax regime, an individual tax
payer accumulates wealth on an after-tax basis, that is, the initial
investment was made from after-tax dollars and the earnings on
that investment are taxed as accrued. Then, following the switch to
a consumption tax, the individual begins to draw on this pretransi
tion wealth to make consumption expenditures. The problem is
that, if the taxpayer is given no special transition relief, the tax
payer's post-transition consumption expenditures made with pre
transition savings will be taxed again. This amounts to a type of
double taxation or tax penalty on those who did most of their sav
ing under the income tax, in the following sense: "The combined
income and [consumption] taxes on an individual caught in the
transition might be greater than the total taxes which would be im
posed if all his income, savings, and consumption had taken place
under either an income tax or [a consumption] tax."145
The question therefore is whether to provide transition relief to
taxpayers caught in this position. One response would be to treat
all pretransition investments as being "tax prepaid" and to exclude
those assets from being taken into account in determining taxpay
ers' consumption tax liability under the new tax system. This would
essentially be a form of grandfather treatment. The response at the
other end of the spectrum would be to provide no transition relief
144. This terminology was first used by the Treasury Department in its discussion of tran
sition issues presented by shifting to a "broadly based tax system," either a broad-based in
come tax or a broad-based consumption tax. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 159-87. The
distinction has been used subsequently and to some extent criticized by tax-policy analysts.
See Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 26, at 1649-59 (acknowledging the distinction but
arguing that the two should be treated analytically as one); Kaplow, supra note 10, at 611-14
(arguing that the two phenomena merit different treatment).
145. Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 26, at 1653-54. For a general discussion of
several different carryover problems, see BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 160-61.
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and to treat the pretransition investments as being tax prepaid.
This would essentially be a form of nominal prospectivity. The
main difference between these two approaches would be the alloca
tion of the relative tax burden across various classes of taxpayers.
The grandfathering or tax-prepayment approach would impose a
relatively low tax burden on taxpayers who have large accumula
tions of wealth when the transition occurs and a relatively high tax
burden on taxpayers whose primary wealth accumulation takes
place after the transition and whose consumption is not funded pri
marily from pretransition wealth.146 The nominally prospective ap
proach would have just the reverse effect. In between these
approaches, one could imagine a number of possible compromise
solutions, involving phased-in or delayed effective dates.147
Whatever proposal is chosen should reflect the government's
determination of the appropriate distribution of the tax burden
among individual taxpayers. Thus, it is possible that social welfare
would be maximized

if a transition rule is

adopted that results in

roughly the same allocation of total tax burden as existed before
the shift from an income to a consumption tax. Alternatively, the
welfare-maximizing transition rule might increase slightly the tax
burden on those taxpayers who have substantial amounts of pre
transition wealth and slightly reduce the tax burden of those who
have not.
146. The Treasury Department explains these effects as follows: "[I]f owners were al
lowed to treat those assets as tax-prepaid, they would receive a gain to the extent they
planned to use them for future consumption. Future income on past accumulated wealth
would then be free from future taxes, and the government would have to make up the differ
ence by raising the tax rate on the remaining consumption regarded as non-pretaxed."
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 160.
147. The Treasury Department proposes a tax-prepaid approach, but it also recommends
a 10-year phase-in period during which taxpayers would be required to calculate their income
under both the old income tax and under the consumption tax and pay whichever tax liability
is greater. Then, at the end of the 10-year period, all unrealized capital gains would be sub
ject to taxation. See id. at 184-85. Graetz contends that the Treasury proposal would pose
undue administrative burdens, and he seems to suggest that the use of a delayed effective
date would be a superior alternative. See Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 26, at 165558. In addition, Graetz suggests that, if the pretransition wealth-accumulation problem must
be remedied, a better approach would be "an immediate deduction of the basis of assets held
on the date of enactment (perhaps limited to a maximum dollar amount with a carryover or
required spread over a period of years)." Id. at 1655. An additional complication is how to
deal with those pretransition assets that were purchased with before-tax dollars, for example,
accumulations in pension funds whose original contributions and earnings have been ex
cluded from the income tax base. If such investments are likewise treated as tax prepaid,
they would be receiving a subsidy rather than a tax penalty upon the shift to a consumption
tax. The obvious solution would be to distinguish pretransition assets according to whether
they were funded by before-tax or after-tax dollars. But this would increase the complexity
of the system considerably. The increase in administrative costs associated with such a sys
tem may or may not outweigh the benefits.
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Note also that under the framework of this article the choice of
the optimal transition policy for dealing with carryover problems
depends more upon distributional issues than incentive issues. This
conclusion is based on the intuition that the failure to provide tran
sition relief in this context probably will not produce the same de
gree of default premiums as an opportunistic incentive-subsidy
transition. That being said, however, it must be admitted that the
shift from an income tax to a consumption tax, if accompanied by
no transition relief whatever, conceivably could have significant in
centive effects, simply because of the potential magnitude of the
wealth transfer. Taxpayers making future decisions regarding sav
ings and consumption would not soon forget receiving such a hit
from the tax collector. In fact, the effect would be similar to that of
an extremely large income tax rate increase, one that was large
enough to have a significant immediate impact on the distribution
of income in society.14s
V.

IMPLEMENTATION

This Part addresses several specific issues of design that arise
out of the thesis of the article. Fir�t, I discuss two practical issues
that must be addressed in the design of an efficient grandfather
clause. Then I return to the theme of government precommitment,
and I outline several possible devices through which Congress
might precommit itself to the tax-transition policy developed in
Parts Il and IV above.
A.

Designing a Grandfathered Effective Date: The Issues of
Transferability and "Under-the-Wire" Investments

Having set forth the basic efficiency argument for guaranteed
grandfather treatment for incentive subsidies, now let us consider
two specific design questions: whether the grandfather treatment
should be transferable and what should be the effective grandfather
date. The first problem asks whether grandfather treatment should
be applied to any investment made prior to the enactment date of
148. Kaplow recognizes an analytical difference between price changes and carryover
problems; he argues that the former should not receive transition relief for incentive reasons,
and the latter should receive some type of transition relief for distributional reasons. See
Kaplow, supra note 10, at 612-14. The difference in my argument is that I would give the
former full transition relief, at least in connection with incentive-subsidy transitions. My
analysis of carryover problems and of income tax rate increases also would apply to other
broad-based tax transitions: for example, the decision to enact an income tax or consump
tion tax in the first place or the decision to increase the amount of social-security benefits
that is subject to income taxation.
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refer to grandfather treatment that attaches to the

investment as transferable grandfathering. Alternatively, grandfa
ther treatment could be applied only to taxpayers who hold the as
sets on the date of enactment or some other specified date, thus
denying the benefits of the new law if the asset is transferred to
another taxpayer. I refer to grandfather treatment that attaches
only to the holder on the date of enactment as
grandfathering.149

nontransferable

An example illustrates the distinction. Assume Congress has
decided to repeal the exclusion for interest earned on state and lo
cal bonds, but it also decides to provide grandfather treatment for
those taxpayers who invested in state and local bonds before the
repeal. Thus, Congress inserts a grandfathered effective date that
applies the old tax exemption to income earned on any state and
local bonds purchased before the date on which the repeal was first
proposed. If this effective date were made nontransferable, the old
tax exemption would be available only to those taxpayers who held
a qualifying tax-exempt bond
Accordingly,

when the repeal was first proposed.

if the taxpayer were to sell the bond under this rule,

the new owner would

not get

the benefit of the grandfather clause

but would be taxed on the income she received from the bond. On
the other hand, if the effective date were made transferable, the
grandfather treatment would follow the bond to the new owner.
Hence, interest earned on the bond would be exempt no matter
who held the bond for as long as the bond generated interest.
Some commentators have argued that transferable grandfather
treatment is inappropriate because it results in a windfall to taxpay
ers who owned the tax-favored assets at the time of the transi
tion.150 This gain occurs because the value of the · grandfathered
asset increases relative to the value of other assets of the same type
that happen to be purchased after the transition and thus do not get
the benefit of the old incentive subsidy. In the example above, the
state and local bonds that enjoy the transferable grandfather treat
ment would, after repeal of the tax exemption, increase in value
relative to those state and local bonds that did not get grandfather
treatment. The holder of the grandfathered bonds could sell them
at a premium. The alternative, however, of using nontransferable
grandfathering could result in a transition loss to the taxpayers
149. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 167; Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 53, 6063. Graetz refers to nontransferable grandfather clauses as "holder-only grandfathered ef
fective dates." Id. at 53.
150. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 20, at 167.
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holding the assets at the time of transition. Under such a rule, the
taxpayer who owned a tax-exempt bond when the repeal was an
nounced would continue to enjoy the tax exemption only so long as
she continued to hold the bond. If, however, she wanted to sell the
bond, its market value would have fallen relative to the value
before the repeal because any purchaser of the bond would be sub
ject to a tax on the bond's interest earnings.
Under the theory of this article, Congress should decide
whether the grandfathered effective dates used in connection with
incentive-subsidy transitions should be made transferable or non
transferable. The type of analysis that Congress should use in mak
ing this decision is akin to the analysis that a product manufacturer
would make in deciding whether to make a warranty transferable or
nontransferable. If a product manufacturer, for example, were to
insert a warranty with its product that guaranteed certain parts for
the life of the product or for as long as the original purchaser owns
the product, the warranty would be in effect nontransferable. The
reason a manufacturer would opt for such a warranty, obviously, is
that the manufacturer would have to pay out fewer claims under its
warranties. In addition, a nontransferable warranty may be less
costly to administer. At the same time, the manufacturer would
hope not to lose so many sales owing to the cheaper, nontransfer
able warranty that the costs of making it nontransferable exceed the
benefits. The alternative (a transferable warranty) would require
more claim payments by the manufacturer but, on net, might pro
duce greater profits because consumers really may want a transfera
ble warranty.
Congress should go through the same cost-benefit analysis when
deciding whether to make its guarantee of grandfathered effective
dates transferable or not, and it should announce its decision pub
licly upon the original enactment of the incentive-subsidy provision.
This could be done either in the statute itself or in the Joint Com
mittee report that is published following the enactment of federal
income tax legislation. If Congress chooses a transferable effective
date, it then might be able to reduce the amount of the initial incen
tive subsidy; for example, instead of a 100% exemption for state
and local bond interest, it could provide a 90% or 80% exemption
and still induce the desired level of investment in state and local
bonds. It is still possible, of course, that a nontransferable effective
date would be the optimal approach. That might be true, for exam
ple, of incentive-subsidy provisions that are paid to taxpayers over
long periods of time. In addition, it might be that a transferable
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effective date would be unduly costly to administer.151 In any
event, clearly the wrong approach (in the interest of reducing de
fault premiums and maintaining the integrity of the taxing author
ity) would be for Congress to give the impression that it would
provide transferable grandfathering only to change its mind at the
time of the transition and apply a nontransferable effective date.
That would be government opportunism.
.

If a grandfathered effective date is to be used, what date should
be chosen: the date of enactment or some earlier date? If the date
of enactment is to be used and if taxpayers know this, there sud
denly will be an enormous incentive (once the transition is being

considered by Congress but before it has been enacted) for taxpay
ers to increase their level of investment in the asset that is going to
lose the preferential tax treatment.

This is sometimes called

"under-the-wire" investment activity, and it can be viewed as a
form of taxpayer opportunism that the optimal transition policy
would discourage. With an ideal transition policy, under-the-wire
investments (those investments that would not have occurred but
for the imminent repeal of the incentive subsidy) would not receive
grandfather treatment.152 At the same time, however, grandfather
treatment should be given to whatever investments were made in
reliance on the incentive subsidy's existence, so long as that invest
ment was made prior to the repeal of the subsidy.153 One possibil151. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 322 & n.42.
152. Under-the-wire investments can also be seen in other transition contexts.

For exam
ple, when word gets out that a state government is planning to exercise its power of eminent
domain to condemn all of the property in a given area for the purpose of building a road,
landowners in the targeted area may have an increased incentive to build structures on their
property because of the prospect of increasing the price the government must pay for their
property. This is a form of moral hazard, and the optimal transition rule would discourage
such investments.
Kaplow suggests that there is no analytical difference between what I call under-the-wire
investing in a tax-favored asset and any other pretransition investment in such an asset. He
argues that they differ only in degree and thus that neither type of investment should receive
grandfather treatment. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 608. I think there is an analytical
difference, which is revealed in the contract analogy. If the government were to enter into a
contract with a private developer under which the developer was to construct low-income
housing units, the contract would include specific terms setting forth what is expected of both
sides, including how many units the government was willing to pay for, a number that the
government presumably determined to be the optimal amount. If the government later de
termined that it no longer wanted to buy government housing from this developer, it would
have to comply with the current contract, but it could decline to enter into future contracts
with the developer. This is comparable to a transition rule guaranteeing grandfathered effec
tive dates for incentive-subsidy transitions. Providing grandfather treatment for under-the
wire investments in the context of an incentive-subsidy transition, on the other hand, would
be akin to allowing the developer in the contract example to force the government to reim
burse it for housing units that were not part of the original contract.

153.
point.

In section III.C supra, I discuss why the enactment date is the appropriate cutoff
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ity would be for Congress to try to sort out these two types of
investments and grandfather the latter but not the former. To do so
with perfect accuracy, however, would be impossible. So we are left
to choose among imperfect alternatives.
Under one approach, grandfather treatment would be provided
to any investments made before the date on which the repeal of the
subsidy was first proposed in Congress.154 Any investment made
before that date would get grandfather treatment; any made after
ward would not. One benefit of that rule would be its adminis
trability; it would provide a bright-line test that could readily be
applied. The problem with the rule, however, is that it is both over
inclusive and underinclusive.

The rule is overinclusive because

some taxpayers receiving grandfather treatment would have en
gaged already in a substantial amount of under-the-wire investing
before that date. Some taxpayers, in other words, will inevitably
learn of the transition proposal before it is formally announced in
Congress and will simply make their under-the-wire investments a
little earlier to circumvent the rule.155 The rule is underinclusive
because some taxpayers who will be denied grandfather treatment
(that is, some of those who make investments after the announce
ment date) will not be engaging in under-the-wire investing at all.
Those taxpayers' post-announcement investments are not moti
vated by the imminent repeal of the subsidy. Of course, some
amount of over- and underinclusiveness is inevitable. And using
the date on which the proposal was first proposed in Congress
seems better than any of the other alternatives. A later date would
probably encourage too much under-the-wire investing, and an ear
lier date would probably be too difficult to administer.156
154. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 607-08 & nn.305-06.
155. One would not be surprised if these taxpayers had expensive tax counsel.
156. If the overinclusiveness problem were thought to be serious, exceptions could be
made in certain cases of egregious abuse. For example, if it could be demonstrated that some
taxpayer suddenly increased her investment in some tax-favored asset by an enonnous
amount the week before a proposal to repeal the tax preference is introduced in Congress,
grandfather treatment could be denied. Likewise, with the underinclusiveness problem, ex
ceptions could be made if taxpayers could prove that their post-announcement investments
would have been made anyway. Both of these exceptions, however, add complexity and cost
to the system.
It is also worth observing that, when an incentive-subsidy provision is enacted, there is
often a compelling reason to make the provision nominally retroactive to the date on which
the provision was first proposed. If Congress announces that it is considering enacting a
particular incentive-subsidy provision, and it announces that the provision will be applied
nominally prospectively if enacted, there will be a large and inefficient lull (perhaps even a
total stop) in the type of investment that the subsidy is intended to encourage. This lull will
begin on the date the proposal is announced and will end on the effective date of its enact
ment, as taxpayers who have been waiting to get the benefit of the subsidy suddenly rush to
make the investment. Because the period between when a subsidy is first proposed and
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Congressional Precommitment Devices

Once we have identified the optimal transition policy for tax
transitions, the next challenge is to develop a mechanism by which
the government can credibly commit itself to this policy. Without
an effective precommitment device, the incentive effects of any
transition policy disappear.1s7 As an initial matter, however, one
might reasonably question the need for a government precommit
ment device, on the theory that the democratic political process and
electoral accountability should be sufficient to ensure that the gov
ernment will always apply the optimal transition policy. For exam

ple, if Congress were to deliberate over whether to repeal the low
income-housing credit and whether to provide grandfather protec
tion for those who had invested in reliance on the credit, those tax
payers who had relied on the credit would have an incentive to
lobby the tax-writing committees to insert such a transition rule. In
addition to the effects of private lobbying, the overall effect of alter
native transition policies on the government's reputation ,and integ
rity may help to keep lawmakers in line. After all, at some later
date (or perhaps even in the same session of Congress) those

lawmakers may want to enact a new incentive subsidy to replace
the old one; they therefore want to minimize the default premium..
For all of these reasons, members of Congress have a strong incen
tive to avoid even the appearance of opportunistic behavior.
So where's the problem? As I suggested in Part II, there may
not be a problem. It is conceivable that, for the reasons just de
scribed, lawmakers already have adequate incentives not to act op
portunistically and instead have incentives to choose the optimal
effective date for every type of tax transition. In other words, it is
entirely possible that the assumption in Part II of congressional my
opia is unfounded. If so, if Congress already is pursuing the optimal
transition policy with respect to tax transitions, then this article
serves to clarify and make explicit the justification for that practice
and to suggest reasons why that transition policy should be solidi
fied and publicized.
when it is enacted and made effective sometimes can be quite long, Congress will often make
the subsidy retroactive to the date on which it was first proposed; that transition rule will be
announced from the very beginning, so that taxpayers will not have an incentive to wait for
enactment before making the investment.

157. See generally Shepsle, supra note 2, at 246·47, 250-57 (discussing, in general terms,
the efficiency benefits of, and outlining several approaches to, "disabling" the government's
discretionary policymaking authority). Kaplow notes that there are incentive benefits to the
government's credibly precommitting to an optimal transition policy; however, he argues that
the optimal transition policy generally is not to provide transition relief. See Kaplow, supra
note 10, at 576.
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It may be the case, however, that there is a problem or at least
the potential for one. First, it has been suggested that, in choosing
effective dates for tax transitions, Congress follows "no discernible
principle" or pattern.158 If that is true, then Congress is not follow
ing any single coherent transition policy but is instead making tran
sition decisions on an ad hoc basis. Second, as discussed in Part II,
it is probably safe to say that lawmakers are like the rest of us and
sometimes fail fully to consider the long-run effects of their deci
sions on the integrity of the government.159 Certainly, lawmakers
will be tempted from time to time to act opportunistically, perhaps
when the need for additional revenue is especially acute (for exam
ple, during a movement for tax reform or deficit reduction) or when
the public's attention is not focused on the decision or when, for
whatever reason, the party that stands to suffer the transition loss
lacks political clout. Therefore, one of the principal aims of this
article is to emphasize the need for lawmakers in all of these situa
tions to take into account the full costs associated with failing to
provide adequate transition relief. Moreover, because of the possi
bility of this sort of temptation, it is worth considering additional
ways in which we might limit the government's ability to give in to
it.160 Indeed, just such a concern, which persists despite the con
straints imposed by the normal political process, explains our deci
sion to make the government subject to contract-law principles.
That being said, let us now consider a number of devices that
might be used to raise the cost to Congress of changing its mind
regarding what transition rule to apply to a given tax transition.
Some of these devices may currently be in use or may have been
tried in the past, although they may not have been understood in
these terms. Others have not yet been tried and should be. For
purposes of this article, we shall concentrate on commitment de
vices that might be used by Congress in connection with changes to
incentive-subsidy provisions in the Internal Revenue Code as well
as some other types of tax transitions. It bears reemphasizing, how
ever, that versions of these devices could be used just as readily by
other levels of government in connection with other types of legal
transitions.
158.

See Graetz, Retroactivity, supra note 9, at 48.
See Kydland & Prescott, supra note 54, at 474.
160. But see Kirk J. Stark, The Elusive Transition to a Tax Transition Policy and the Role
for a Grandfather Rules Budget, AM. J. TAX POLY. (forthcoming 1996) (arguing that congres
159.

sional precommitment is unlikely to work, given the history of frequent tax-Jaw changes and
given structural changes in congressional committees which allow more input by more di
verse parties than previously).
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Contract Law: Lessons From the Winstar Case

Contract law could provide a way to force the government to
shoulder the costs of opportunistic tax transitions. One could allow
taxpayers harmed by the repeal or elimination of an incentive sub
sidy to sue for damages under a breach-of-contract theory. The ap
propriate remedy would presumably be expectation damages or
some approximation thereof, which could be calculated by deter
mining what the relying party's return would have been had the
incentive subsidy not been repealed or, alternatively, had the sub
sidy been repealed but grandfathered. Making such damage calcu
lations would be no simple task. But it would be no more difficult
than making damage calculations in other contract disputes. In ad
dition, as I- suggested in section III.C above, the difficulties inherent
in determining who would be entitled to recover in the event of a
repealed subsidy would be no greater than the difficulties inherent
in determining who is entitled to recover in any complex contrac
tual dispute.
A recent decision by the Federal Circuit provides some insight
into how contract law can be used to hold Congress and its agents
to their commitments. In Winstar Corp. v. United States,161 the Fed
eral Circuit, upholding the Court of Claims, essentially found that
Congress, through the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC),
had entered into contracts with a number of savings-and-loan insti
tutions ("thrifts") and that Congress had broken those contracts.
What is interesting for current purposes is that the nature of the
events that gave rise to those contracts were not terribly different
from the circumstances surrounding the use of any incentive
subsidy.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, interest rates were extremely
high and many thrifts were on the brink of insolvency, in part be
cause of long-term fixed-loan obligations entered into during peri
ods of relatively low interest rates. As a result, instead of enacting
a direct subsidy payment to the failing thrifts or taking them over
and running them directly, the FHLBB and FSLIC offered special
regulatory-accounting treatment to any healthy thrift that would
merge with a failing thrift. The special accounting treatment effec
tively allowed those thrifts that responded to the inducement to
treat certain assets of the ailing thrift (the so-called supervisory
goodwill) as regulatory capital, thereby making it easier for the ac161. 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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quiring thrifts to satisfy regulatory solvency requirements. I call
this the "Winstar subsidy." A number of healthy thrifts responded
to the inducement: They applied to the FHLBB for approval of
their plans to merge with ailing thrifts; after a series of negotiations,
the Bank Board approved the plans, and the mergers took place.
In 1989, however, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),162
which included, among many other things, a provision that essen
tially eliminated the Winstar subsidy. Furthermore, and what is
most important for the purposes of this article, Congress in the
FIRREA provided no transition relief for those thrifts that had re
lied upon the subsidy. Therefore, as a result of the FIRREA, many
thrifts were thrown into noncompliance with regulatory-solvency
requirements. Some of the thrifts so harmed, including the Winstar
Corporation, sued the United States in the Court of Claims, alleg
ing that the provision in the FIRREA which eliminated the Winstar
subsidy amounted to a breach of contract. The Court of Claims
held for the thrifts, and the Federal Circuit agreed.
The holding in these cases is consistent with the framework of
this article. Had the courts reached the opposite conclusion and
had the government been permitted to renege on its deals with the
thrifts, there probably would have been serious consequences for
the future use of incentive subsidies. Any future attempt by Con
gress or its agents to use accounting subsidies to induce financial
institutions to change their investment decisions would require a

substantial default premium. Moreover, if the courts had held in
favor of the government, commercial parties in many contexts (not
just thrifts faced with favorable accounting rules) would suddenly
become more suspicious of government promises of future benefits
and likely would demand a substantial default premium before act
ing in reliance on government inducements.163
162. Financial Institutions Refonn, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in relevant part at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994)).
163. One commentator has argued that the Winstar court's reasoning was deeply flawed
because it failed to recognize that the original incentive subsidy (the special accounting treat
ment promised for healthy thrifts that merged with ailing ones) was a mistake from the start
and that Congress, in passing the FIRREA, "was right to negate these deals." Jonathan R.
Macey, Rule of Law: The Court Gets It Half Right on Firrea, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1995, at
Al3. It is unclear whether the author would apply the same reasoning to government con
tracts. If so, the analysis would seem to suggest that the government should have the right to
annul any government contract that it detennines ex post to have been ill-advised, without
having to pay damages. In addition, the author at times seems to suggest that government
"bureaucrats" should not have been in charge of detennining which thrifts received the
favorable accounting treatment: "Congress [when enacting FIRREA] should have gone
much further and relieved all federal bureaucrats of the power to cut special deals with par
ticular favored constituents." Id. But that argument proves too much; under similar reason-
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The holding in Winstar, of course, does not imply that contract
law should necessarily apply to the repeal of a generic incentive
subsidy, such as an incentive tax credit. There are potentially im
portant differences between the subsidy in the Winstar case and a
tax credit. For starters, in the Winstar situation, each applicant for
the accounting subsidy was required to negotiate the deal with the
government via the Bank Board in advance of any merger. Thus,
the subsidy was structured very much like a traditional government
contract. The enactment of a tax credit, however, does not neces
sarily require negotiation on a taxpayer-by-taxpayer basis.
Fair enough. Neither the magnitude nor the relevance of this
difference should be overstated, however. First, many business tax
payers do, in effect, seek preapproval of some types of tax subsi
dies. This can be seen, for example, in taxpayers' requests for
private-letter rulings from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), rul
ings that are often considered necessary by taxpayers before they
will enter into certain tax-favored transactions. Likewise, with re
spect to some incentive tax subsidies, the Treasury Department
promulgates detailed regulations setting forth specific requirements
that must be met by any taxpayer who seeks the benefit of the sub
sidy. Given these facts, the difference between the incentive tax
subsidy and the Winstar subsidy seem less obvious.
Consider the following scenario: Congress enacts an incentive
subsidy in the form of a tax credit; the Treasury Department issues
regulations detailing the requirements that a taxpayer must satisfy
in order to receive the credit; and the IRS issues numerous rulings
explaining how the credit will apply in many different specific fac
tual situations. Unsurprisingly, some taxpayers act in reliance on
the regulations and rulings and make some investments expecting
to receive the credit. If, at that point, Congress were to repeal the
credit without providing grandfather treatment, the resulting transi
tion losses would be quite similar to the damages suffered by the
plaintiffs in Winstar.
Even

if,

however, one is persuaded that the economics of the

Winstar subsidy are not substantially different from the economics
of other incentive subsidies, to apply the holding of Winstar to the
repeal of an incentive tax subsidy might require a change in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. Under the "unmising, Congress should never delegate authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the federal
government, merely because of the possibility that "special deals" might result. Elsewhere in
the article, however, the author appears to agree with the Federal Circuit's holding in Winstar
that the government must pay contract damages. See id.
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takability doctrine," as it has been applied, the enactment of an in
centive subsidy may not be considered an action by Congress
expressly intended to bind future congresses.164 What if, however,
upon enacting an incentive tax credit, Congress were to insert lan
guage of the following sort: Any taxpayer who acts in reliance on
this incentive credit and who claims the credit on her federal in
come tax return will have a contractual right to that credit so long
as the credit is in force and has not been repealed as of the time the
investment is made; this right will be enforceable against the U.S.
government. Arguably, such a contract would be enforceable.165

2. Formal and Informal Procedural Changes in Congress
If one rejects the use of contract law as a congressional precom
mitment device in this context, there are other potential means of
binding Congress to keep its commitments. Congress could insti
tute formal or informal procedures that would impose roadblocks
to changing the tax laws in ways that are inconsistent with the opti
mal transition policy. In the context of incentive-subsidy transi
tions, Congress could adopt formal or informal rules that prevent
the enactment of legislation that would repeal or substantially re
duce any existing incentive subsidies unless grandfathered effective
dates were also provided. The one exception to this rule would be
any change in tax provisions that can easily be defended as a mea
sure designed to correct an obvious error of the sort described in
section IV.A above. Such a transition policy could be implemented
through a change in the House or Senate rules. For example, the
following rule could be adopted:
Any legislation that would repeal or cut back an incentive subsidy
must include a grandfathered effective date. If, however, it is demon
strated that the legislation is necessary to correct an obviously errone
ous taxpayer interpretation of the prior law, and if the legislation
designed to make this correction is submitted to Congress within one
year of the enactment of the prior law, no grandfathering is necessary.
Furthermore, in situations involving corrections of obvious errors of
this sort, the effective date will be made nominally retroactive to the
date of enactment of the original provision.166
164. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 5154 (1986); see also Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1546-47.
165. Under the Winstar holding, if Congress were then to repeal the incentive tax credit
without providing transition relief, arguably the U.S. government could be sued in contract.
Moreover, consistent with Winstar, legislation repealing such a credit would not be exempted
from contract principles by the "sovereign-acts" doctrine. See Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1548-50.
166. If this rule seems too strict, it could be changed as follows: If legislation repealing or
cutting back an incentive-subsidy provision does not include a grandfathered effective date
and does not satisfy the "error-correction" exception, it must be passed by a three-fifths vote
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This formulation presents some obvious difficulties, which I dis

cussed in section IV.A above. The benefits of such a provision may,
however, be more than offsetting.
The House of Representatives recently adopted a rule that is

similar to the one suggested above but that is directed at income tax

rate increases. The rule prevents consideration of a "bill, joint reso
lution, [or] amendment . . . carrying a retroactive Federal income
tax rate increase."167 As suggested in the previous Part, this rule
could indeed be efficient, as it gives taxpayers some measure of as
surance that Congress will not d� again what it did in 1993; namely,

enact a nominally retroactive rate increase.

The House also

adopted another rule change, one that requires a three-fifths vote

rather than the normal majority vote to enact a tax increase. The

new rule provides, specifically, as follows: "No bill, joint resolution,
amendment, or conference report carrying an income tax rate in
crease could be considered as passed or agreed to unless so deter

mined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the members
voting. "168 This provision has provoked considerable criticism from
legal academics, primarily from scholars of constitutional iaw.169

The principal criticism is that the change in the House rules is in
consistent with the text, structure, and history of the Constitution
and inconsistent with past congressional practice. I leave those is
sues for now to the constitutional scholars and congressional his

torians.170 Instead, I want to emphasize the potential efficiency

benefit of the new House rule, a benefit derived from the effect of
the rule on taxpayers' expectations about future changes in federal

income tax rates. Although, as I suggested in section IV.B.1, most
income tax rate increases probably do not significantly distort work
incentives, they do distort them some. To the extent the new House
rule reduces the likelihood of rate increases or at least reduces the
likelihood of extremely large rate increases, these distortions are

rather than a nonnal majority of lawmakers. Also, Congress could create a list of Code
provisions that qualify as "tax subsidies," much as it has done with tax expenditures. The
fonner list would likely be shorter than the latter because it would include only those tax
expenditure provisions that are designed for their incentive effect (that is, for their effect on
taxpayers' investment decisions) and not those that are primarily redistributive in nature.
167. H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.

§ 106 (1995).
§ 106 (1995).
169. See Comment, An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539 (1995)
168. H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.

(calling for reconsideration of the resolution regarding three-fifths-vote requirement) (signed
by 17 Jaw professors).
170. See also John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality ofLeg
islative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995) (defending the

constitutionality of the three-fifths-vote requirement).

1188

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 94:1129

mitigated, and allocative efficiency is enhanced. In addition, the
new rule will reduce the number of rate changes over time, which
will reduce the administrative costs associated with frequent Code
revisions, not the least of which are fees paid to attorneys and
accountants.171

If, for whatever reason, formal procedural rules are shunned, a
similar precommitment function could be served by the congres
sional tax-writing committees. Thus, for example, the House Com
mittee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee
could serve the function of strengthening and enforcing the institu
tional presumption in favor of grandfathering significant changes to
incentive-subsidy provisions.172 If those committees were to adopt

an informal practice of requiring grandfather clauses to be attached
to all amendments to incentive-subsidy provisions, with the excep
tion of corrective legislation mentioned above, and

if this

practice

were made known to taxpayers, default premiums could be reduced
significantly.113

3.

Allocating Authority to the Treasury Department and the IRS

The allocation of decisionmaking authority by Congress to ad
ministrative agencies can be seen as an important type of precom
mitment technique. When Congress delegates authority to an
agency, it does so for two general reasons: (a) to put a particular
type of decision in the hands of experts who have the training and
the time to do the job properly and (b) to give the decisionmaking
authority to individuals who are relatively free from the influences
171. Another example of a procedural rule designed to limit Congress's legislative discre
tion is the Gramm-Rudman Act. See generally Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution:
The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593 (1988). Of course, the ultimate
rule of this sort would be a constitutional amendment requiring Congress to provide transi
tion relief in these contexts. See, e.g., supra note 132 (citing proposals to amend the Constitu
tion to prohibit retroactive tax rate increases).
172.

See Shepsle, supra note 2, at 256 (arguing that a "division of labor committee system
enables credible public commitments because it disables discretion of momentary majori
ties"); id. at 254-57.
• . .

173. Again, this may already be the practice of congressional committees most of the
time. If so, the practice should be clearly articulated and publicized. One example of this
practice occurred during recent hearings of the Ways and Means Committee when Commit
tee Chairman Bill Archer stated publicly that no "loophole" would be reported out of com
mittee unless accompanied by equivalent revenue offsets. See Archer Says No to "Rifleshots"
at Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals, 68 TAX NoTES 239 (1995). One commentator has
noted that congressional precommitment via the committee structure has become more diffi
cult in recent decades because of procedural reforms that serve to "open" the tax-writing
process to more interested parties than before. Stark, supra note 160. If that is so, this article
sheds light on one significant cost of such a trend: the increased default-premium effect re
sulting from Congress's reduced ability to make credible precommitments in the tax area.
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of politics.174 It is the latter reason that I want to emphasize. The
model of this sort of delegation is the allocation of control over the
money supply to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.115 The Board is a semi-independent body, consisting of
seven members appointed by the President with the advice and con
sent of the Senate for staggered fourteen-year terms.176 A member
who has served a full term may not be reappointed.111 One of the
principal justifications for allocating so much power to such an insu
lar group is the perceived need to remove the control of the money

supply from the influence of everyday politics.178 Specifically, if
elected politicians, whether they be congresspersons or the Presi
dent, were to maintain direct control over the money supply, they
would inevitably be tempted to exercise that control in a manner
that would maximize their chances of winning reelection but that
undermined the long-run value to the economy of maintaining a
stable money supply.179 To prevent this type of abuse, the authority
is entrusted to a group of well-respected economic experts who are
unlikely to be aligned with any particular politician and whose pro
fessional reputations depend largely upon their ability to maintain
the long-run integrity of the money supply and the overall stability
of the economy.180
As with the Federal Reserve Board, it is possible to understand
the Treasury Department and the IRS as precommitment devices.
Congress allocates a great deal of decisionmaking authority to the
Treasury Department and in turn to the Service. 'Ii'easury is em
powered by section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code to issue reg
ulations interpreting virtually any provision in the Code.181 This
authority is quite broad, and, although the regulations promulgated
under this statutory grant do not technically have the same binding
174. Another, perhaps more realistic way of describing the second reason for delegation
is this: to allow Congress to avoid political accountability for hard decisions that must be
made. I do not focus on that justification in this article.
175.

See generally ALFRED BROADDUS, A PRIMER ON TiiE FED (1988).
See id. at 14.
177. See id.
178. See id. ("The purpose of this [14-year] term of office is to insulate members from
176.

routine day-to-day political pressures.").

179. See, e.g, Kenneth Rogoff, Reputation, Coordination, and Monetary Policy, in MOD
BusINESs CYcLE THEORY 236 (Robert J. Barro ed., 1989) (demonstrating the benefits of
credible government commitment to optimal monetary policy).
ERN

180. All of this is not to say that the Board of Governors is entirely independent of Con
gress or the President. Together, Congress and the President could abolish the Fed, just as
they created it, by statute. Moreover, there is a strong expectation that the Board will follow
a monetary policy that is generally consistent with the current fiscal policy.
181.

See I.R.C. § 7805 (1996).
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effect as the Code itself, as a practical matter, they have some bind
ing effect for most taxpayers most of the time. In addition, some
times when Congress enacts a new tax provision, it will insert a
specific grant of regulatory authority, empowering the Treasury to
issue regulations that are just as authoritative as the Code itself.
The Service also issues rulings of various types that provide a
statement of how it will interpret specific Code provisions in certain
circumstances. These rulings are sometimes issued publicly in the
form of published revenue rulings. They are also sometimes issued
directly to taxpayers as private-letter rulings, informing them how
the Service would interpret a given Code provision in the taxpayers'
specific circumstances. Both public and private rulings can be chal
lenged by taxpayers as inconsistent with the Code; indeed, taxpay
ers challenge them quite often. Nevertheless, much more often
taxpayers simply follow the rulings as if they were the law. Finally,
the Treasury Department and the Service exercise lawmaking
power in their decisions regarding enforcement practices, that is,
the decisions concerning where to concentrate tax-enforcement re
sources, what arguments to make in litigation, how flexible to be in
settlement negotiations with taxpayers, and on what issues to settle.
To explain this allocation of decisionmaking authority to the
Treasury Department and to the Service, most commentators have
relied primarily on the technical-expertise argument. Because the
details of tax law are often extremely technical and arcane, it is con
sidered necessary that a large measure of lawmaking authority be
given to a group of well-trained and experienced experts in tax law
and policy. That justification has merit. Nevertheless, another rea
son to allocate authority to these institutions is the benefit of poli
cymaking stability over time. Unlike the members of the Federal
Reserve Board, the high-level officials in the Treasury Department
and in the IRS essentially serve at the discretion of the President;
therefore, they are in some ways much more politically accountable
for their decisions than members of the Fed are. The same techni
cal nature of the tax field that serves to justify their grant of author
ity, however, also serves to protect them from political pressure.
Most of the regulations and rulings interpreting the tax laws go un
noticed entirely by members of Congress. In addition, the people
who are chosen to staff the high-level positions in the Treasury
Department and in the Service, with the exception of the Secretary
of Treasury, are almost always tax professionals, either tax lawyers
or tax-law professors who have devoted their careers to under
standing the tax laws and whose long-run professional success de-
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pends upon their reputations as tax experts and not their ability to
carry out political agendas.182
Perhaps Congress should, for precommitment reasons, increase
the extent to which it delegates lawmaking authority to the Treas
ury Department and the Service, particularly in the area of incen
tive subsidies. Although a fully developed proposal along these
lines is beyond the scope of this article, the basic outline of the idea
should be obvious. The Treasury Department and the Service
would be given a greater role in the design of such incentive subsi
dies as the incentive tax credits, as well as in decisions regarding
whether to extend those credits and under what terms. In wielding
this new power, the Treasury Department and the Service would be
acting as an agent of Congress with the mandate to maximize the
long-run efficiency of the economy, and they would continue to be
subject to congressional oversight. They, however, would be one
step removed from the heat of the political forces that sometimes
cause the sort of government myopia of which Bister and others
warn.183 Obviously, the tradeoff with such a proposal is that an
enormous amount of power and control over the disbursement of a
tremendous amount of government revenue would be placed in the
hands of nonelected officials. Whether such a delegation would be
unprecedented in magnitude or scope, however, is unclear.

4.

Built-In Precommitment Devices: Termination Dates and
Up-Front Subsidies

In addition to these general precommitment devices, there are
various ways in which an incentive-subsidy provision could itself be
designed so as to reduce the likelihood of its opportunistic repeal,
repeal without transition relief. For starters, when enacting new in
centive subsidies or when revising old ones, Congress could in
crease its use of termination dates. With certain types of incentive
tax provisions, primarily those that are in the form of business cred
its, Congress commonly inserts a specific termination date. Then, if
it decides to extend the provision in subsequent years, it does so
either on a year-by-year basis or on some other periodic basis. For
example, the research credit typically contains a specific termina182. That being said, one of the principal dangers of allocating authority to an agency is
the risk of capture by the industry being regulated. See generally George J. Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sa. 3 (1971). Arguably, how
ever, the Treasury Department and the IRS are less susceptible to capture than a typical
administrative agency, in part because of the relative size of their constituency.
183. EISI'ER,

supra note 1, at 87-103.
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tion date that is one year from the previous date of extension;1B4
thus, if the credit is to remain in effect, Congress must vote every
year to extend it. In contrast, in 1990, Congress extended the termi
nation date of the alcohol-fuel credit from December 31, 1992, to
December 31, 2000.185 In some instances, credits that have been
subject to specific termination dates are made "permanent," which
simply means that, to repeal the provision in the future, instead of
just allowing the provision to expire, Congress must pass a law to
repeal it.186
With an explicit termination date in effect, it becomes much
more difficult for Congress to act opportunistically. Because the
effective date of the termination is set in advance, the taxpayer can
read for itself whether the provision will apply to a particular in
vestment. Moreover, it is almost inconceivable that Congress
would decide to apply the termination retroactively when the termi
nation date arrives.187 That would be tantamount to the sort of ex
treme opportunism described in the government-contract example
above, which Congress is likely to find unpalatable.188 Indeed, fail
ure to leave the subsidy in effect at least until the stated termination
date looks very much like a breach of our express contract. There
fore, an explicit termination date, in effect, serves as a guaranteed
grandfathered effective date in the event the provision is not ex
tended. How long the optimal termination period will be (one year
or several years) is an empirical question that Congress would have
to decide in each case.189
Next, Congress could increase its use of up-front incentive subsi
dies and reduce its use of installment subsidies.190 In the absence of
184.

See I.R.C. § 41(h) (1996).

185. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.
(codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.).

L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-480

186. Before 1978, the investment tax credit had always been "temporary" in the sense
that it always had included a termination date. In 1978, however, Congress made the ITC
"permanent," which meant that the credit would remain in force until specific legislation was
enacted to repeal or reduce it. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763,
2824 (codified in scattered sections of l.R.C.).
187. Although it is fairly common for Congress to extend termination dates or even to
make them "permanent," I have been unable to find a single example of Congress prema
turely repealing a provision that had an explicit termination date.
188. Graetz recommends increased use of termination dates, but for a different purpose.
He sees them as a means of putting taxpayers on notice that they should expect the tax laws
to change and therefore should take that fact into account. See Graetz, supra note 9, at 87.
189. A one-year period may be insufficient in some circumstances. For example, the leg
islative history of the 1978 Act states that the reason the ITC was made permanent was that
the uncertainty created by the "temporary" status was reducing the effectiveness of the ITC
as an incentive device. See S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1978).
190. For a definition of these terms, see supra Part I.
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a precommitment to 'provide guaranteed grandfatheririg, it can be
argued that an up-front subsidy will give rise to a smaller default
premium than an installment subsidy. If an installment subsidy is
repealed, serious transition losses can occur· even

if the

repeal is

made nominally prospective, that is, in the absence of grandfather
ing. On the other hand, if an up-front subsidy is repealed, the use
of a nominally prospective effective date would provide substantial,
if not full, transition protection for those who had invested in reli
ance on the provision. Put differently, an up-front subsidy essen
tially comes with a built-in grandfather clause. Hence, to make the
repeal of an up-front incentive subsidy nominally retroactive, Con
gress would essentially have to enact a special nominally retroactive
tax designed to recapture the benefit previously conferred. Con
gress would be somewhat more reluctant to enact such a recapture
tax than to enact a nominally prospective repeal of an installment
subsidy.191
Kaplow also observed that up-front subsidies contain built-in
grandfather treatment.192 In keeping with his general position
against transition relief, however, Kaplow concludes that the up
front design of incentive subsidies should be avoided.193 Goldberg
also recognizes the difference between up-front subsidies and in
stallment subsidies or, to use his terms, "one-time" and "periodic"
subsidies. Unlike Kaplow, however, Goldberg extols the built-in
grandfather feature of up-front subsidies.194 He goes on, however,
to suggest that periodic subsidies will always be inefficient.195 In
my view, that claim goes too far. Although installment subsidies
present a potential default-premium problem, it still is conceivable
that the installment design, on balance, could be more efficient than
the up-front design, just as a contract that is structured so that pay191. Golberg asserts that once an up-front subsidy has been enacted it cannot be repealed
retroactively. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 310. He also argues that "a one-time [up
front] subsidy is completely predictable because there is 100% certainty that it will be ob
tained." Id. at 327. Whereas, he contends that an installment subsidy "can never attain that
level of predictability so long as there is a risk of uncompensated termination." Id.
Although, as explained in the text that follows, I agree generally that up-front subsidies pro
duce smaller default premiums than installment subsidies do, I think Goldberg overstates the
case a bit.
192. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 587.
193. See id. ("Thus, the analysis of grandfather provisions should be applied to initial
program design decisions concerning the appropriate timing of taxes and subsidies. Pro
grams typically should not be designed so as to incorporate grandfathering, because it is
generally undesirable." (footnote omitted)}.
194. See Goldberg, supra note 12.
195. See id. at 306 ("Periodic subsidies are inefficient and are likely to decrease the horizontal equity of the tax' system.").
1
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ments are made in installments could be more efficient (that is, pro
duce more overall wealth for the contracting parties) than a
contract that is structured so that a single lump-sum payment is
made up front. For example, budgetary constraints in a particular
year could make it impossible for Congress to enact an up-front
incentive subsidy that is sufficiently large to induce the desired
change in behavior; whereas, an installment subsidy, which spreads
the payments over a larger number of budgetary periods, could be
made more generous and therefore more effective. 196 Moreover,
the default-premium effect of the installment design could theoreti
cally be addressed by a credible government precommitment to
providing grandfather treatment in the event the installment sub
sidy is repealed.197 In fact, it is theoretically possible that the most
efficient means of reducing the default premium is not the up-front
subsidy but some other form of grandfathering.
Thus, enacting incentive subsidies with specific termination
dates or with up-front benefits are ways of decreasing the likelihood
of retroactive repeal, that is, repeal without transition relief. Put
differently, when Congress uses those devices, it not only promises
taxpayers that it will subsidize their investments with an incentive
tax provision but also signals with a fair degree of credibility that it
will not renege on the deal.
CONCLUSION

As the tax-reform movement gathers momentum, there will be a
temptation to use transition losses rather than tax-rate increases to
meet revenue goals. This article has provided an argument for why
Congress should resist that temptation, at least when the deduction,
exclusion, or credit being repealed is an incentive subsidy. And it
has provided an argument for why, in such situations, full transition
relief in the form of grandfathered effective dates will often be ap
propriate. Moreover, this article has argued that whenever Con
gress decides to use an incentive subsidy as a means of altering
taxpayers' incentives, it should give serious consideration to the op
timal design of that subsidy. Among the considerations that should
196. Goldberg suggests that the only purpose served by spreading the cost of a subsidy
over several budgetary periods is obfuscation, that is, to hide the true cost of the subsidy.
See id. at 312. Indeed, obfuscation may play a role in the use of installment subsidies. How
ever, there are economic as well as political reasons to use the installment form. For exam
ple, the use of the installment subsidy rather than an up-front subsidy of equal expected
value may permit the government to avoid having to fund the subsidy with deficit financing.
197. Goldberg seems to disagree with this argument, even as a theoretical matter. See id.
at 327 ("[Tjhe need for risk premiums for periodic subsidies cannot be avoided.").
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be taken into account are (a) whether the benefits of the subsidy
should be paid up front or provided in installments over time, (b)
whether express termination dates should be used, and (c) if the
promise of a grandfathered effective date is to be included, whether
grandfather treatment will be made transferable or not. In addi
tion, if Congress finds itself unable keep its implicit or explicit
promises not to repeal incentive-subsidy provisions without provid
ing grandfather treatment, some sort of external precommitment
technique should be considered, whether it be a formal contract, a
legislative procedural reform, or a delegation of lawmaking author
ity to the Treasury Department.
The message of this article, however, is not limited to changes in
the federal income tax laws. The important similarities between
government contracts and incentive subsidies and the important dif
ferences between those two types of government action and other
types of government action whose effects are less narrowly focused
apply in nontax settings as well. Some of those nontax settings I
have mentioned already,198 but the point bears repeating: When
ever the government makes a policy decision (a change in the law
or a change in the application of the law or whatever) the relevant
government decisionmaker should consider the extent to which the
new decision undermines earlier government commitments and
therefore hinders the ability to make future commitments. When
the default-premium effect is potentially large, the decisionmaker
should consider implementing some form of transition relief.
I will conclude with an example of potential government oppor
tunism that looms on the horizon as of this writing. The recent
budget battles between the Republican-controlled Congress and
the Democratic White House and the inability of the parties to
reach a final agreement on a budget have increased the risk that the
federal government will actually default on its debt obligations. In
fact, Moody's Investor's Service publicly announced that, because
of the budget deadlock, it was reviewing nearly $400 billion of U.S.
Treasury securities for possible downgrade.199 According to one
Wall Street Journal report, "[i]f the rating agency downgrades U.S.
debt, which would be an unprecedented ac�ion, it would almost cer
tainly raise the cost of public borrowing."200
198.

See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
Moody's Puts Treasury Debt Up for Review, WALL ST. J., Jan.

199. See Fred Vogelstein,
25, 1996, at Cl.

200. Christopher Georges & David Rogers, A
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1996, at A24.
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If a budget deadlock 'and the threat of default can produce a
downgrade in the U.S. credit rating, imagine what the effect of an
actual default would be. A default of that sort would amount to a
catastrophic

form

of government opportunism.

Notwithstanding

the recent announcement by Moody's, few experts believe that the
government will in fact default on its obligations, precisely because
of the size of the harm that would result.201 In this article I have
emphasized that a similar sort of risk, the default-premium effect,
lurks behind many government decisions, and although the magni
tude of the effect in each case probably is minuscule compared to
the prospect of a default on the federal debt, in the aggregate, over
time, the costs may be quite high. Moreover, these may be costs
that, with some careful attention to the design of an optimal transi
tion policy, can be substantially reduced. The worst response to
those costs, however, is to ignore them.

201. See Vogelstein, supra note 199.

